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I. INTRODUCTION
In Mineral County v. Lyon County (Mineral County),1 the Nevada Supreme
Court recently interpreted the public trust doctrine fundamentally differently from

* Roderick E. Walston is a member of the Best, Best & Krieger law firm, in Walnut Creek,
California, and specializes in natural resources and water law. He has served as Deputy Solicitor and
Acting Solicitor of the U.S. Department of Interior; Chief Assistant Attorney General of California (Public
Rights Division); California Deputy Attorney General; and General Counsel for the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California. As a California Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Walston argued several
cases involving western water law issues in the U.S. Supreme Court, including California v. United States,
438 U.S. 645 (1978). He has also argued several cases cited in this article, including, notably, the Mineral
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the California Supreme Court in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court
(National Audubon),2 the well-known Mono Lake decision. The public trust doctrine,
which derives from the English common law and is traceable to ancient Roman law,
holds that the state has sovereignty over its navigable waters and underlying lands
and that the state holds the waters and lands in trust for the public for certain
common public uses.
In Mineral County, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the public trust
doctrine applies to all waters and water rights in Nevada, but does not authorize
modification or reallocation of water rights adjudicated by the courts in order to
provide water for public trust uses. In National Audubon, conversely, the California
Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine requires that the state maintain
continuing authority over water rights, with authority to modify and reallocate the
rights to protect public trust uses. Thus, while National Audubon held that the
public trust doctrine authorizes reallocation of water rights to protect public trust
uses, Mineral County held that the doctrine does not authorize reallocation of
court-adjudicated water rights for such purposes.
The Mineral County and National Audubon cases also differ more broadly
on the nature and scope of the public trust doctrine itself. In Mineral County, the
Nevada Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine requires the state to
regulate water in the public interest and that the Legislature fulfilled its public trust
responsibility by enacting a statutory water rights system that provides for the
regulation of water in the public interest. The court also held that the statutory
system provides that court-adjudicated water rights are final and non-reallocable
and that such finality serves the public interest by facilitating development of water
supplies to meet the public’s present and future needs, such as food production,
domestic use, hydropower generation, and the like. The court thus deferred to the
Legislature’s judgment that finality of water rights is in the public interest and held
that the public trust doctrine does not mandate a contrary result by authorizing
reallocation of the rights.
In National Audubon, on the other hand, the California Supreme Court held
that the public trust doctrine and California’s statutory water rights laws represent
two different principles of law that are on a “collision course,” and the court
undertook to integrate these different legal principles into a unified system of
regulation. The court held that the state is required to consider—but not
necessarily preserve—public trust uses in regulating water rights and may
County and National Audubon Society cases that are the subject of the article; as a California Deputy
Attorney General, he represented the State of California in the National Audubon Society case in the
California Supreme Court, and in his current practice he represented Lyon County in the Mineral County
case in the Nevada Supreme Court. The views expressed herein are those of Mr. Walston and should be
attributed to no one else.
1. 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020).
2. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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reallocate water rights if necessary to protect public trust uses. The court thus
fashioned common law public trust principles that apply to and potentially override
the legislative judgment. For example, while the Legislature’s statutory water rights
laws provide that domestic water use is the highest use of water in the state, the
court held that the state must preserve public trust uses if “feasible,” which
suggests that “feasible” public trust uses are the highest use of water.
Thus, while National Audubon held that the public trust doctrine and the
statutory laws are on a “collision course” and must be integrated by the courts into
a unified system of regulation, Mineral County held that the statutory laws
incorporate the public trust doctrine and the doctrine is already integrated into the
statutory system of regulation. While National Audubon established common law
principles that bind and potentially override the legislative judgment in protecting
the public interest, Mineral County deferred to the legislative judgment that its
statutory laws are in the public interest. Although National Audubon held that the
public interest is served by preserving public trust uses for present and future
generations, Mineral County held that the public interest is served by the finality of
water rights because finality ensures that water will be available for the public’s
present and future needs. Mineral County and National Audubon thus diverge on
the nature of the public interest served by the public trust doctrine and on the very
nature and scope of the doctrine itself.
Indeed, Mineral County and National Audubon even diverge concerning
the nature and location of public trust uses protected by the public trust doctrine.
Mineral County held that public trust uses consist of water uses that the Legislature
has deemed to be beneficial to the public and in the public interest—which includes
not only environmental uses such as fisheries and recreation but also economic
uses such as food production and domestic uses—and that such public uses may be
within the source stream or elsewhere. National Audubon, on the other hand, held
that the public trust doctrine protects only uses within the source stream, and—
although acknowledging that the doctrine protects both commerce and
environmental uses—the court focused so extensively on instream environmental
uses that it appeared to regard the doctrine as primarily protecting such uses rather
than other uses of water. The decisions thus diverge on whether the public trust
doctrine protects only instream uses or out-of-stream uses as well, and whether
the doctrine primarily protects instream environmental uses rather than other uses
that are beneficial to the public. The question, more broadly, is whether the public
trust doctrine is a state sovereignty doctrine, as Mineral County indicated, or
primarily an environmental law doctrine, as National Audubon suggested.
In examining these issues, this article will be structured as follows: Part I
will describe the foundation of the public trust doctrine. The United States Supreme
Court has held that the states have sovereignty over their navigable waters and
underlying lands under the equal footing doctrine of the United States Constitution
and that the states hold the waters and lands in trust for the public’s common use.
This principle, as shall be seen, is the foundation of the public trust doctrine as it
exists today. The western states, in exercising their sovereignty over the waters and
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lands, have enacted comprehensive statutory water rights laws that provide for the
regulation of the use of water, and the statutory laws provide significant protection
of public uses and the public interest in the waters and lands.
Part II will describe the public trust doctrine itself, as developed by the
United States Supreme Court in its seminal decision in Illinois Central Railroad
Company v. Illinois.3 Illinois Central determined that the State of Illinois holds its
navigable waters and underlying lands in trust for the public, and therefore the
State had the right to revoke its grant of a private property interest to a railroad
company in lands underlying Lake Michigan in order to utilize the lands for public
purposes, which in that case was commerce.4
Part III will describe the California Supreme Court’s decision in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, which undertook to “integrate” the public trust
doctrine—a judicially-fashioned doctrine of common law—into California’s
statutory system for regulation of water rights. National Audubon held that the
public trust doctrine, as integrated, provides that the state has continuing
supervisory authority over water rights, with the authority to modify and even
reallocate the rights if necessary to protect public trust uses.
Part IV will describe the Nevada Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Mineral County v. Lyon County, which held that the public trust doctrine requires
the state to regulate water in the public interest and that the Nevada Legislature
fulfilled its trust responsibility by enacting statutory water rights laws in the public
interest. Mineral County also held that—since the Legislature determined that
finality of adjudicated water rights is in Nevada’s public interest by providing for the
development of water supplies for the public’s present and future needs—
judicially-adjudicated water rights are final and conclusive and not subject to
reallocation.
Finally, Part V will compare the National Audubon and Mineral County
decisions and describe how they diverge. The decisions diverge on specific elements
of the public trust doctrine such as the nature of public trust uses protected by the
doctrine, but also on the broader question of the nature and function of the
doctrine itself, specifically whether the courts should defer to the legislative
judgment in regulation of water rights or should instead establish common law
principles that apply to and bind, and potentially override, the legislative judgment
in regulating the rights. The decisions thus diverge not only on the more narrow
issue of how to define the public interest in regulation of water, but also on the
broader question of the respective roles of the legislative branch and the judicial
branch in determining the public interest in regulation of public resources. The
decisions may also diverge on whether a state’s reallocation of water rights under

3. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
4. Id. at 463–64.
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public trust principles would result in a “taking” of water rights that would require
the state to pay compensation to the holders of the rights.
In sum, Mineral County and National Audubon establish two different
lodestars for interpretation of the public trust doctrine. These different lodestars
may guide the courts of other states in fashioning their own public trust doctrines,
and in determining which lodestar to follow.
II. FOUNDATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: STATES’ SOVEREIGNTY OVER
NAVIGABLE WATERS
A. State Sovereignty Under Equal Footing Doctrine
Prior to the American Revolution, the American colonies, as part of the British
empire, were governed by the English common law.5 Under the English common
law, the British Crown possessed sovereignty over all navigable and tidal waters,
including lands underlying the waters, but the Crown’s sovereignty was subject to
certain “common rights” of the public, particularly the public’s right of navigation,
free passage, and fishing.6 Under the English common law, “the title in the soil of
the sea, or of arms of the sea, below ordinary high water mark, is in the King,” and
“this title, jus privatum, whether in the King or in a subject, is held subject to the
public right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing.”7 Thus, in the American
colonies the Crown had sovereignty over navigable and tidal waters and the
underlying lands, subject to certain public “common rights” such as navigation and
fishing.
In Martin v. Waddell,8 one of the great landmark decisions in American
judicial history, the Supreme Court in 1842 held that, as a result of the American
Revolution, the Crown’s sovereignty over navigable waters and underlying lands
was transferred to the original thirteen states.9 The decision, written by Chief
Justice Roger B. Taney, held that “when the Revolution took place, the people of
each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute
right to their navigable waters and the soil under them, for their own common use,
subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general
government.”10 Although the Supreme Court might have held that the Crown’s
5. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894).
6. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2012); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S.
261, 283–84 (1997); Shively, 152 U.S. at 13.
7. Shively, 152 U.S. at 13.
8. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 410. Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the
United States has the right to regulate navigable waters in furtherance of interstate commerce. E.g.,
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899); Shively, 152 U.S. at 57–58.
Under the Property Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, the United States may reserve
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sovereignty over the waters and lands was transferred to the new national
government, perhaps under its constitutionally-delegated power to regulate
interstate commerce,11 the Court instead held that the Crown’s sovereignty was
transferred to the new states.12
Moreover, Waddell held that the states did not hold the waters and lands
in a traditional propriety capacity but instead for the “common use” of the public.13
As the Supreme Court contemporaneously explained in another decision, “this soil
is held by the State, not only subject to, but in some sense in trust for, the
enjoyment of certain public rights, among which is the common liberty of taking
fish.”14 The principle established in Waddell—that the states have sovereignty over
navigable waters and underlying lands that are held for the public’s common use—
has been followed in numerous Supreme Court decisions, and is the settled law of
the land.15 The states’ ownership of the waters and lands, the Supreme Court has
held, is “an essential attribute of sovereignty.”16
Although Waddell followed the English common law in holding that the
states have sovereignty over waters that are both navigable and tidal, the Supreme
Court later departed from the English common law in holding that the states’
sovereignty applies to navigable waters regardless of whether they are tidal.17 As
the Court explained, all navigable waters in England—a relatively small country
located on an island—are influenced by the tide, but many navigable waters in

water for use on federal lands that have been reserved from the public domain for specific purposes,
such as for Indian reservations, national monuments, and the like. E.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. 128, 138 (1976); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699–702 (1978).
11. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that the federal government, “[a]s the owner of
the public domain, . . .possessed the power to dispose of land and water thereon, or to dispose of them
separately.” Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935).
12. Waddell, 41 U.S. at 367.
13. Id.at 410.
14. Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 74–75 (1855).
15. See, e.g., PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 589–91 (2012); Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521
U.S. at 283–84; Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand, 429 U.S. 363, 372–74 (1977); United States
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717 (1950); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Shively, 152 U.S. at
26–27, 49–50; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381–82 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877).
16. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987).
17. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870); Barney, 94 U.S. at 337–38; PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S.
at 590; Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 285–86. As the Supreme Court explained in Daniel Ball, while the
ebb and flow of the tide was the general test in England, because no waters are navigable that are not
also tidal, the situation in America is fundamentally different, because many waters are navigable for
great distances by large vessels but are not affected by the tide. 77 U.S. at 563. On the other hand, if the
waters are nonnavigable rather than navigable, the United States retains title to the underlying lands
and its title is unaffected by admission of the new state. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14.
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America are located far from tidal waters and are unaffected by the tide.18 Thus,
the English rule limiting sovereignty to navigable waters that are tidal does not
apply in America.
Shortly after Waddell was decided, the Supreme Court issued another
landmark decision, Pollard v. Hagan,19 which held that all states are admitted to the
Union on an equal footing with other states in terms of their sovereignty, and thus
that newly-admitted states acquire the same sovereignty over their navigable
waters and underlying lands as the original thirteen states.20 This principle—the
equal footing doctrine—has been followed in numerous Supreme Court decisions
and is also the settled law of the land.21 Under this doctrine, the United States holds
navigable waters and underlying lands in trust for the future state prior to its
admission to statehood, and fulfills its trust responsibility by conveying the waters
and lands to the state when it joins the Union.22 The equal footing doctrine rests on
a constitutional rather than statutory foundation; the state’s title in the waters and
lands “is conferred not by Congress but the Constitution itself.” 23 Thus, the state’s
sovereignty over the waters and lands does not depend on the terms of the
congressional statute admitting the state to statehood, but instead derives from
the Constitution itself. Under the equal footing doctrine, when the western states
were admitted to statehood, such as California in 1850 and Nevada in 1864, the
states acquired sovereignty over their navigable waters and underlying lands by
force of the Constitution itself.24
In sum, Waddell and Pollard established the bedrock constitutional
principle that the states have sovereignty over their navigable waters and
underlying lands that had formerly belonged to the British Crown under the English
common law, and that the states hold the waters and lands for the common use
and benefit of the public. The seeds of the public trust doctrine—which, as will be
explained later, provides that the states hold their navigable waters and lands in
trust for the public for its common use—were planted in the soil of the English
common law and transported to American law as a consequence of the Revolution.

18. See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. at 74–75.
19. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
20. Id. at 228–29.
21. See, e.g., PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 590; Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 284; Shively, 152
U.S. at 26–27, 49–50; Barney, 94 U.S. at 338; Hardin, 140 U.S. at 381–82.
22. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Texas, 339 U.S. at 717. The United States
is deemed to transfer the waters and lands to the state in the absence of “some international duty or
public exigency,” United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926), but, “because control over the
property underlying navigable waters is so strongly identified with the sovereign power of government,”
there is a “strong presumption against conveyance by the United States.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 552.
23. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd., 429 U.S. at 374; PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 591.
24. In re Waters of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324, 330 (Cal. 1988); Nevada v. Bunkowski,
503 P.2d 1231, 1233–34 (Nev. 1972).
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B. The Western States’ Water Rights Laws
i. The Appropriation and Riparian Doctrines
The western states, in exercising their sovereignty over surface waters,
have adopted two principal doctrines of water law: the appropriation doctrine and
the riparian doctrine. The Supreme Court has held that the states have the right to
adopt either doctrine under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution,25 which
reserves to the states the powers not delegated to Congress, and that “Congress
cannot enforce either rule upon any State.”26
The riparian doctrine derives from the English common law.27 The doctrine
provides that an owner of land has, as an incident of ownership, the right to use
water flowing across or adjacent to the land, subject to reasonable use by other
riparian landowners.28 The riparian right attaches to the soil and is not personal to
the landowner; thus, the right is not created by the landowner’s use of the water
nor lost by the landowner’s nonuse.29 The riparian doctrine is well suited to areas
that have ample rainfall and relatively abundant water supplies, such as England,
where the doctrine originated, and the eastern states, which have generally
adopted the riparian doctrine as their basic water law.30
The riparian doctrine is less well suited, however, to the arid and semiarid
states of the western United States, which lack the relatively abundant water
supplies found elsewhere in the nation. The maps of the early cartographers often
labeled the area west of the 100th meridian as the “Great American Desert,”31
reminiscent of the Sahara and Gobi Deserts found on other continents. Because of
their lack of adequate water supplies, the western states developed a different
doctrine of water law—the doctrine of prior appropriation, or simply the
appropriation doctrine—that provides for more efficient use of limited water

25. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . .
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89–90
(1907).
26. Kansas, 206 U.S. at 94; Cal. Or. Power Co.295 U.S. at 163–64;Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,
174 U.S. at 702–03.
27. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 744 (1950); Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation
Co., 174 U.S at 774–75.
28. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. at 965–66; Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889,
891–92 (Cal. 1967); Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 753 (Cal. 1886); ANTHONY DAN TARLOCK & JASON ANTHONY
ROBISON, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3.1031-32 (Thomson Reuters 2017 ed.); WELLS A. HUTCHINS,
THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS, at 178–80 (1956).
29. Lux, 10 P. at 753.
30. United States v. U.S. Bd. of Water Comm’r, 893 F.3d 578, 597–98 (9th Cir. 2018).
31. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 648 (1978).
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supplies and enables them to be more efficiently allocated for public needs and
uses.
The appropriation doctrine originated as a custom among the miners who
rushed to California after the discovery of gold in 1849.The miners needed water to
separate the gold from the dross, but could not claim riparian water rights because
the lands on which their mining claims were located were owned by the federal
government. The miners, ignoring the niceties of the riparian doctrine, adopted a
simple custom under which the first miner who “appropriated”—that is, diverted
and used—water had a prior right to its use as against subsequent appropriators;
to be “first in time” was to be “first in right.” 32 This simple mining custom was
recognized by local courts and legislatures, and ripened into the doctrine of prior
appropriation that is the prevalent water law of the West today.
Under the appropriation doctrine, a water user has the right to
appropriate water if, and only so long as, the water is put to “beneficial use,” and
the first appropriator has a prior right as against subsequent appropriators.33
Congress recognized the appropriation doctrine as the basic water law of the
western states and territories in enacting mining acts in 1866 and 187034 and in
particular the Desert Land Act of 1877; the latter Act provided that settlers who
acquired federal patents in the public domain lands of the western states and
territories were required to comply with the appropriation laws of the states and
territories.35 In California Oregon Power Company v. Beaver Portland Cement
Company,36 the Supreme Court held that these enactments, particularly the Desert
Land Act, had effected a “severance” of the waters of the western states and
territories from the lands themselves, as a result of which the federal government
regulated and controlled the lands but the water rights on the lands were subject
to regulation and control by the western states and territories.37 The appropriation
doctrine has been a major factor in the growth and development of the western
states, by authorizing transfers of water—often by massive federal and state water
projects, such as the federal Central Valley Project in California—from rural and
mountainous regions where most of the water supply originates to distant
farmlands and urban areas, where the water is needed for human use, such as
agricultural and domestic uses.38
32. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457–58 (1879); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146–47 (1855); In re
Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324, 330 (1988).
33. E.g., Hallett Creek, 749 P.2d at 330; Joslin, 429 P.2d at 891–92; TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note
28, §§ 5.3–5.4 at 246–249; HUTCHINS, supra note 28, at 130–37.
34. Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 251, 253; Act of July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 217, 218.
35. 43 U.S.C.A. § 321 (West) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377)
(water rights of settlers depend on “bona fide prior appropriation,” and “shall not exceed the amount
of water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for the purpose of irrigation and reclamation”); Cal.
Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 156; Hallett Creek, 749 P.2d at 463.
36. 295 U.S. at 142.
37. Id. at 162; Hallett Creek, 749 P.2d at 331.
38. See, e.g., California, 438 U.S. at 651–53 (describing federal Central Valley Project in California).
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Although California recognizes appropriative water rights based on the
early mining custom, California also recognizes riparian rights by virtue of its
adoption of the English common law shortly after its admission to statehood.39 In
Lux v. Haggin, the California Supreme Court in 1886 held that California, having
adopted the English common law as its rules of decision, adopted the riparian
doctrine that is part of the English common law.40 California thus has a dual system
of water law, which recognizes both appropriative and riparian rights.41 Effective in
1914, the California Legislature enacted a statutory system that regulates
appropriative water rights; under the statutory system, a state agency, the State
Water Resources Control Board (State Water Board), is responsible for regulating
appropriative water rights, and may issue permits for appropriation of water to
those who meet the statutory requirements.42
Many other western states, unlike California, do not recognize riparian
rights, and instead recognize only appropriative rights in regulation of surface
waters.43 In Nevada, for example, the Nevada Legislature enacted a statutory
system in 1913 that regulates appropriative water rights,44 and that authorizes the
State Engineer, who administers the statutory system, to issue permits for
appropriation of water.45 Nevada, however, does not recognize riparian rights.46
The riparian and appropriation doctrines differ in many fundamental
respects. The riparian doctrine derives from the English common law, and the
appropriation doctrine from the custom of the early miners. The riparian doctrine
establishes parity among competing riparian users, and the appropriation doctrine
establishes priority among competing appropriators. Justice Robert Jackson, writing
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2. (West 1850).
40. Lux, 10 P. at 746–51.
41. Hallett Creek, 749 P.2d at 332; People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 864 (Cal. 1980); HUTCHINS,
supra note 28, at 40–41.
42. CAL. WATER CODE § 1250 (West 1943); Shirokow, 605 P.2d at 863–65. Water rights in California,
whether appropriative or riparian, were originally based on the common law, in that they were
recognized by the courts but not established by the Legislature. California’s statutory water rights
system, as adopted by the Legislature in 1914, applies to appropriative water rights acquired
subsequently to the date of the enactment, 1914 but does not apply to pre-1914 appropriative rights
recognized prior to that date or to riparian rights. Shirokow, 605 P.2d at 863–65; see Hallett Creek, 749
P.2d at 324. The State Water Board may, however, prioritize and quantify riparian rights that have not
been exercised. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 667–69 (Cal. 1979). In sum,
appropriative and riparian water rights in California are governed by a mixture of statutory and common
law principles.
43. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 490 (Cal. 1935); TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 28, §
5:11.
44 Ormsby County v. Kearney, 142 P. 803, 805–06 (Nev. 1914).
45. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.324 (West 1993).
46. Walsh v. Wallace, 67 P. 914, 917 (Nev. 1902); Peabody, 40 P.2d at 490.
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for the Supreme Court, once characterized the riparian doctrine as socialistic—
because it is based on egalitarianism among riparian users—and the appropriation
doctrine as capitalistic, because it awards priority to the first appropriator as against
subsequent appropriators.47
The appropriation and riparian doctrines are similar in one important
respect, however. Both provide that a water right is a usufructuary and not a
possessory right, in that the water user has a right to use water but does not own
the water or its corpus in a conventional proprietary sense. 48 Rather, the water is
“owned” by the public, which may grant rights to its use. 49 This fundamental
precept, as shall be seen, is a pivotal feature of the public trust doctrine, which is
based on the principle that ownership and dominium of water belongs to the public
and not the water user.
ii. Public Interest in Regulation of Water
Although the appropriation doctrine as originally conceived established
priority among competing appropriators, the doctrine as it has evolved provides
significant protection of the public interest in regulation of water.
First, the appropriation doctrine even as conceived does not authorize
appropriation of water for any use but only for a “beneficial use,”50 which is a use
that is beneficial to the public and not just the water user. Examples of beneficial
uses are uses for irrigation, domestic and urban needs, hydropower, recreation,
protection of fish and wildlife, and the like51—all of which benefit the public and
not just the water user. The United States Supreme Court has declared that the use
of water for irrigation in the arid western states is a “public use,” because it enables
the production of food needed for the public.52 Indeed, Nevada law expressly
provides that beneficial use of water as a “public use.”53 As the Nevada Supreme
Court has stated, “the concept of beneficial use is singularly the most important
public policy underlying the water laws of Nevada and many of the western
47. Gerlach Live Stock, 339 U.S. at 745, 750.
48. See Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853); United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182
Cal. App. 3d 82, 101 (1986); HUTCHINS, supra note 28, at 36–38.
49. E.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1943) (“All water within the State is the property of the
people of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner
provided by law.”); NEV. REV. ANN. STAT. § 533.025 (West 1913) (“The water of all sources of water supply
within the boundaries of State, whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the
public.”).
50. Cal. Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 154; Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd.,
20 Cal.Rptr.3d 898, 904 (2004); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100, 1240 (West 1943); TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra
note 28, § 5:68.
51. CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1955).
52. Cal. Or. Power, 295 U.S. at 165; see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.050 (West 1913) (“The
beneficial use of water is hereby declared a public use . . . .”).
53. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.050 (West 1913).
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states.”54 Beneficial uses are not static, however, and may change as public needs
change. As the California Supreme Court has declared, “[w]hat is a beneficial use at
one time may, because of changed circumstances, become a waste of water at a
later time.”55 Thus, the concept of beneficial use ensures that appropriation of
water serves the public interest and not just the private economic interest.
Second, many states have modified their appropriation laws to provide
that the use of water must be not only beneficial but also reasonable in light of all
relevant circumstances. The people of California adopted a constitutional
amendment in 1928, now codified in article X, section 2 of the California
Constitution, which provides that the right to use water in California exists only to
the extent that the water is put to “reasonable and beneficial use.” 56 This rule, often
referred to as the rule of reasonable use, is regarded as California’s basic water
law.57 The rule of reasonable use requires that the water use must not only be
beneficial to the public, but must also be reasonable in light of other competing
water needs dependent on the same water resource. 58 The California Supreme
Court has held, for example, that the commercial use of water to produce sand and
gravel was not reasonable when compared with the competing needs of a
municipal water agency to provide water for local citizens and residents.59 As the
court stated, whether a water use is reasonable depends on the circumstances of
the case, and must take into account “statewide issues of transcendent
importance,” such as “the ever increasing need for conservation of water in this
state.”60 Other western states, following California’s example, have also adopted
the rule of reasonable use.61 The rule of reasonable use further provides protection
of the public interest in the regulation of water.

54. Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (Nev. 1997).
55. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 1007 (Cal. 1935).
56. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2021); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at
725–26; Joslin, 429 P.2d at 892–93; Peabody, 40 P.2d at 492–93; Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d
5, 15–16 (Cal. 1933). The 1928 constitutional amendment overturned the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Company, which held that riparian rights based
on the common law have priority over appropriative rights based on custom where the rights are in
conflict. Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 619 (Cal. 1926). As the result of the constitutional
amendment, both appropriative and riparian rights exist only to the extent water is put to “reasonable
and beneficial” use. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
57. People ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal.Rptr. 851, 855 (1976) (“[T]he
overriding principle governing the use of water in California is that such use be reasonable.”)
58. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 492 P.2d 889, 892–93 (Cal. 1967); In re Waters of Long Valley
Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 665 (Cal. 1979).
59. Joslin, 492 P.2d at 894–96.
60. Id. at 894.
61. See TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 28, § 5:11.

170

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 58

Third, many states, including California and Nevada, have further modified
their water rights laws to explicitly provide that the appropriation of water must be
in the “public interest,” which further ensures that the appropriation of water is in
the public interest and not just the interest of the water user. Under California law,
for example, the State Water Board is authorized to issue an appropriative water
right permit only if the proposed use is in the “public interest,” and the Board may
impose conditions in the permit to ensure that the use is in the “public interest.”62
Similarly, Nevada law prohibits the State Engineer from issuing an appropriative
permit for a proposed use that is “detrimental to the public interest.”63 The public
interest requirement, by definition, protects the public interest in regulation of
water.
Thus, while the appropriation doctrine as originally conceived established
priority among competing appropriators, the doctrine in its modern form provides
significant protection of the public interest, by providing that water may be
appropriated only for uses that are reasonable and beneficial and in the public
interest. The doctrine in its modern form is not simply capitalistic, as Supreme Court
Justice Jackson has opined, because the modern doctrine provides that, regardless
of priority of use, the right to use water exists only if the use serves the needs and
interests of the public.64 The modern appropriation doctrine is consistent with the
principles envisioned by the Supreme Court in its landmark decisions in Martin v.
Waddell and Pollard v. Hagan, and the English common law principles on which
those decisions are based, which, as described earlier, provide that the state has
sovereignty over navigable waters and that its sovereignty is subject to the public’s
common use.65
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN ILLINOIS
CENTRAL
In Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, the Supreme Court in 1892
held that the State of Illinois has sovereignty over its navigable waters and
underlying lands, which are held in trust for the public, and therefore the State has
the right to revoke a private property interest in the lands in order that they may
be utilized for other public purposes.66 Although Illinois Central is generally
regarded as the seminal public trust decision in America,67 the decision did not in
fact create a new doctrine of law, but rather clarified and expanded the principle
previously established in Martin v. `Waddell and Pollard v. Hagen and that derived
from the English common law, namely that the state has sovereignty over navigable

62. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255, 1257 (West 2021).
63. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.370(2) (West 2019).
64. See Gerlach Live Stock, 339 U.S. at 745, 750.
65. Martin, 41 U.S. at 410; Pollard, 44 U.S. at 228–29; see supra text accompanying notes 5–24.
66. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
67. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980).
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waters and lands that are held in trust for the public’s common use. 68 Indeed, the
roots of the public trust doctrine are traceable to ancient Roman law; the Institutes
of the Roman Emperor Justinian declared that “[b]y the law of nature these things
are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea and consequently the
shores of the sea.”69
In Illinois Central, the State of Illinois, through its Legislature, had granted
to a private railroad company a fee interest in the tidal and submerged lands of
Lake Michigan, which had been reclaimed and formed much of the Chicago
waterfront.70 Illinois later decided to develop the waterfront as a harbor to
accommodate commerce and shipping on Lake Michigan, and sought to rescind its
grant of a fee interest to the railroad company.71 The railroad company argued that
it owned the lands and thus Illinois did not have the right to rescind title to the
lands.72 Illinois brought an action against the railroad company in the Illinois courts
to rescind the fee grant, claiming that Illinois owned the tidal and submerged lands
and did not have the power to divest itself of its ownership of the lands.73 The case,
after being removed to the federal courts by the railroad company, eventually
reached the United States Supreme Court.74 The issue was whether Illinois or the
railroad company owned the tidal and submerged lands of Lake Michigan that had
been conveyed to the railroad company.75
The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Stephen Field, upheld
Illinois’ claim that it owned the tidal and submerged lands and could rescind its
grant of a fee interest to the railroad company.76 The Court stated that Illinois,
having been admitted to statehood on an equal footing with other states, acquired
sovereignty, ownership and dominium over lands covered by navigable waters,
with the right to dispose of the lands if that can be done “without substantial
impairment of the interest of the public in the waters.” 77 The state’s title in the
lands, the Court held, is different from that held by the state in other lands intended
for sale; rather, the title is “held in trust for the people of the state, that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty
68. PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 603; Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 284–86; Shively, 152 U.S. at
13; Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 458; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12–13 (N.J. 1821); see supra text
accompanying notes 5–24.
69. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 718 (quoting Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1); see Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. at 744–45.
70. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 433.
71. Id. at 433–34.
72. Id. at 438–39.
73. Id. at 439.
74. Id. at 433.
75. Id. at 439.
76. Id. at 435.
77. Id.
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of fishing therein.”78 The Court stated that “[t]he state can no more abdicate its
trust over the property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable
waters and soils under them, . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.” 79 The Court
stated that the state can never lose control of the lands for purposes of the trust
except for parcels that “are used in promoting the interests of the public therein,
or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in
the lands and waters remaining.”80 The Court concluded that the legislature did not
have the power to grant lands underlying navigable waters, and thus the
Legislature’s grant of lands to the railroad company was “subject to revocation” if
not “absolutely void on its face.”81
Thus, Illinois Central held that Illinois, which has sovereignty over lands
underlying navigable waters, holds the lands in trust for the public, and had the
right to rescind its grant of a private property interest in the lands in order to utilize
them for other public purposes, such as commerce and shipping. Although Illinois
Central substantially rested on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Waddell and
Pollard, which had held that the states have sovereignty over their navigable waters
and underlying lands under the equal footing doctrine and that the states hold the
waters and lands for the public’s common use, Illinois Central went beyond the
earlier decisions by holding that the state’s obligation to hold the lands in trust for
the public authorized the state to revoke a private property interest that it had
earlier granted in the lands. Illinois Central described the nature of the state’s
obligation to hold the waters and lands in trust for the public in much greater detail
than the earlier decisions.
The public trust doctrine, as Illinois Central and other courts have
recognized, is a common law doctrine rather than a constitutional or statutory one,
because it has been fashioned by the courts rather than adopted as part of the
state’s constitutional and statutory laws.82 Many states have, however, adopted
constitutional or statutory provisions that codify, at least in part, the principle of
the public trust doctrine that the waters within the state belong to the state, and
that the state has an obligation to regulate the waters on behalf of the public. 83 To
the extent that the public trust doctrine has been codified in the states’

78. Id. at 452.
79. Id. at 453.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 437.
82. Id. at 452, 458; see City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 437 (Cal. 1970); People v.
Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374, 375 (Cal. 1897).
83. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2021) (“All water within the State is the property of the people
of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner provided
by law.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.025 (West 2021) (“The water of all sources of water supply within
the boundaries of the State whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the
public.”).
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constitutions and statutes, the doctrine is a constitutional or statutory doctrine
rather than a common law one.
On its face, Illinois Central appeared to suggest that the public trust
doctrine is a federal law doctrine. Illinois Central extensively cited the United States
Supreme Court’s own decisions in support of its decision, such as Waddell and
Pollard, that held that the states have sovereignty over their navigable waters for
the common use of the public, and the Court cited only a smattering of Illinois
decisions on minor and technical points.84 Thus, Illinois Central appeared to regard
the public trust doctrine as a corollary of the federal law principle established in
Waddell and Pollard—that, just as the states acquire sovereignty over their
navigable waters under the constitutional equal footing doctrine and hold the
waters in trust for the public, the states have a concomitant responsibility under
federal law to regulate the waters on behalf of the public. It is not entirely surprising
that Illinois Central may have viewed the public trust doctrine as one of federal law,
because the Supreme Court during this earlier period in its history was more prone
than the modern Court to adopt general principles of federal common law.85
Several years later, however, the Supreme Court declared that Illinois
Central was based on Illinois law, not federal law. 86 As the Supreme Court recently
stated, each state is responsible for developing its own public trust doctrine, and
for determining the nature of the state’s own public duties in regulating navigable

84. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 457–58.
85. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 8–12 (1842) (holding that federal courts apply federal
common law rather than state common law in diversity cases), overruled by Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 77–78 (1938); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464–65 (1922) (applying federal common law
doctrine of equitable apportionment rather than state water law in resolving interstate water dispute);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (holding that federal courts may select
state law as applicable federal rule of decision, but may develop federal common law if state law is
inadequate to serve federal purposes). The modern Supreme Court appears much more reluctant than
the earlier Court to adopt federal common law. The Court has held that that federal courts, unlike state
courts, are not general common-law courts, but may develop federal common law where “Congress has
not spoken” or there is “significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state
law.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312–13 (1981). Notably, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals—in a collateral proceeding to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Nat’l Audubon, 658
P.2d 709, to be discussed below—rejected the California Supreme Court’s claim in National Audubon
Society that LADWP’s diversions from Mono Lake tributaries violate the federal common law of nuisance,
stating there is no federal common law of nuisance. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of Water & Power, 869
F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1988).
86. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (Illinois Central “was necessarily a
statement of Illinois law”).
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waters and underlying lands.87 Thus, the public doctrine, in defining the state’s
obligation to regulate waters in the public interest, is unequivocally a doctrine of
state law and not federal law.
Even so, the public trust doctrine is a federal law doctrine to the extent it
holds that under the U.S. Constitution the states acquire sovereignty over their
navigable waters upon their admission to statehood, and in determining whether
the waters were navigable at that time and thus the states have jurisdiction over
them.88 Thus, federal law determines whether the waters were navigable when the
state was admitted to statehood and whether the state has jurisdiction over the
waters, and state law determines the nature of the state’s public trust
responsibilities once it is determined that the waters are navigable and subject to
the state’s jurisdiction.89 As the Supreme Court recently stated, “the contours of
[the] public trust do not depend upon the Constitution”; rather, “[u]nder accepted
principles of federalism, the States retain residual power to determine the scope of
the public trust over waters within their borders, while federal law determines
riverbed title under the equal-footing doctrine.”90
In sum, although the public trust doctrine has some features of both
federal law and state law, the doctrine is a state law doctrine in determining the
rights and responsibilities of the state in regulating navigable waters and underlying
lands on behalf of the public. There is no national public trust doctrine that
uniformly applies to all states and defines their duties in regulating public trust uses.
Rather, each state is responsible for developing its own public trust doctrine and
defining its own public trust duties. The public trust doctrine and the state’s trust
duties may vary from state to state, depending on how each state defines its
doctrine and trust duties.91
As the nation’s population and economy have grown, and the states have
become more aware of the need to protect their navigable waters and underlying
lands for present and future generations, the courts of several states have followed
the principles established in Illinois Central in defining their own public trust duties.
87. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603-04 (2012) (first citing Appleby, 271 U.S. at 395;
and then citing Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 285) (the public trust doctrine “remains a matter of state
law”); see also Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd., 429 U.S. at 374; Montana, 450 U.S. at 551.
88. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14.
89. PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 604.
90. Id.
91. In Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Land Comm’n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984), the Supreme
Court held that California’s public trust doctrine does not apply to water rights encompassed in Spanish
and Mexican land grants made prior to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which was signed in 1848 and
ended the war between the United States and Mexico. As the Court stated, the United States established
a commission in 1851 to implement the treaty and determine the validity of the land grants under
Mexican law, and authorized the commission to issue patents confirming the validity of the land grants.
Id. at 203. The Court held that—since California did not appear in the proceedings before the commission
to claim that the land grants were subject to California’s public trust doctrine—California’s public trust
doctrine does not apply to the land grants. Id. at 206–09.
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The California Supreme Court has held, for example, that the state holds lands
underlying navigable waters, such as tidelands, in trust for the public, and that the
state can convey the property interest in the lands if the lands are “substantially
valueless” for trust purposes, but cannot convey the property interest if the lands
are still physically adaptable for trust uses.92 While Illinois Central defined public
trust uses as navigation, commerce, and fisheries, the California Supreme Court has
expanded public trust uses to also include various environmental uses, such as
hunting, bathing, swimming, recreation, and preserving tidelands in their natural
state.93 The California Supreme Court has also held that the legislature is
responsible for administering the public trust and that its judgments are
“conclusive,”94 which suggests that the legislature’s public trust judgments are not
reviewable by the courts, or, if reviewable, are entitled to substantial deference.
The courts of other states have also followed Illinois Central in defining
their own public trust doctrine and duties. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that
the public trust doctrine applies in Nevada, and that the doctrine is based on the
state’s constitution and statutes and the “inherent limitations on the state’s
sovereign power” established in Illinois Central.95 Applying these principles, the
Nevada Supreme Court has held that the state has sovereign ownership of the beds
and banks of navigable waters; that any private rights in the beds and banks are
subject to the state’s overriding sovereign ownership; and that the public trust
doctrine requires the state to meet several conditions in granting private rights in
the beds and banks.96 The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that the public
trust doctrine requires the state to consider public trust uses in planning the
92. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 373 (Cal. 1980); see also California v. Superior
Court (Lyon), 629 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1981) (holding that land between natural high and low water marks is
subject to private ownership but is impressed with the public trust); California v. Superior Court
(Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981) (determining boundary between public and private ownership as to
dam that altered natural level of Lake Tahoe).
93. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 (Cal. 1971).
94. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 437 n. 17 (Cal. 1970); Mallon v. City of Long Beach,
282 P.2d 481, 486 (Cal. 1955); see Marks, 491 P.2d at 391 (“It is a political question, within the wisdom
and power of the Legislature, acting within the scope of its duties as trustee, to determine whether
public trust uses should be modified or extinguished, and to take the necessary steps to free them from
such burden.”).
95. Lawrence v. Clark County, 254 P.3d 606, 614 (Nev. 2011).
96. Id. at 607 (public trust doctrine provides that state’s authority to transfer beds and banks of
navigable waters depends on various factors, such as whether the waters were navigable when Nevada
was admitted to statehood and whether the lands became dry by reliction or avulsion); State Eng’r v.
Cowles Bros., Inc., 478 P.2d 159, 162 (Nev. 1970) (doctrine of reliction of public lands applies against the
state); Nevada v. Brunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1235–37 (Nev. 1972) (since Carson River was navigable
when Nevada was admitted to statehood, Nevada acquired ownership of the river bed and patents
granting ownership of the bed are subject to Nevada law).
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allocation and use of water.97 The Montana Supreme Court has held that under the
public trust doctrine and the state’s constitution any surface waters capable of use
for recreational purposes may be used by the public irrespective of who owns the
stream bed.98 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the public trust doctrine does
not preclude the state from leasing docketing facilities on the bay of a navigable
lake to a private entity.99
Although these and other state supreme court decisions have applied the
public trust doctrine in various contexts, none of the decisions directly addressed
whether and how the doctrine—a common law doctrine fashioned by the courts—
applies to the states’ regulation of water rights, where the states have enacted
statutory systems that comprehensively regulate water rights and provide for
allocation of water under the doctrine of prior appropriation. Although the states
may have an abstract public trust duty to regulate water in the public interest, the
decisions did not indicate how this abstract duty applies to the states’ actual
regulation of appropriative water rights under their statutory laws. The question,
more broadly, is whether and how to amalgamate and integrate the public trust
principles fashioned by the courts into the states’ statutory systems for regulating
appropriative water rights. This was the question addressed by the California
Supreme Court in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), and
more recently by the Nevada Supreme Court in Mineral County v. Lyon County, et
al. This article will now describe these decisions.
III. CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, decided in 1983, the
California Supreme Court stated that the public trust doctrine and the state’s
appropriative water rights laws “exist independently of each other” and represent
“two systems of legal thought” that are on a “collision course,” and the court
undertook to “integrate” these principles into a single, unified system of
regulation.100
In the case, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), a
public water agency that develops and provides water for the people of Los Angeles
in southern California, obtained part of the water by diversions from tributaries
flowing into Mono Lake, which is located in northern California. 101 LADWP was
authorized to divert the water pursuant to an appropriative permit issued by
California’s State Water Board in 1940.102 Several decades later, the National
97. United Plainsman Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D.
1976).
98. Montana Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 169–71 (Mont. 1984).
99. Kootenai Env’t All. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094–96, 105 Idaho 622, 631–
33 (1983).
100. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 712, 732.
101. Id. at 712.
102. Id.
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Audubon Society (NAS) brought an action against LADWP in the California courts to
enjoin the diversions.103 NAS claimed that the diversions violated the public trust
doctrine and were illegal because they reduced inflows into Mono Lake and thus
impaired environmental values in the lake, such as aesthetics and recreation.104
LADWP argued that it had a vested right to divert the water and that its diversions
were legal, because its permit issued by the State Water Board did not impose
conditions to protect the environmental values in the lake.105 In issuing its permit
to LADWP in 1940, the State Water Board believed that it lacked power to impose
such conditions because the statutory laws provided then, as now, that domestic
water use is the highest use of water in the state.106 The State of California
intervened and argued that the State Water Board was authorized under the
constitutional and statutory water rights laws, and particularly the rule of
reasonable use, to impose new conditions in LADWP’s permit to protect Mono
Lake’s environmental uses.107
In its decision, the California Supreme Court held that the public trust
doctrine authorizes “reconsideration of the allocation of the waters” of the Mono
Lake basin.108 The court held that the doctrine authorized the State Water Board to
reconsider LADWP’s permit and impose conditions to preserve Mono Lake’s
environmental uses, and that LADWP did not have a vested right that precluded
such reconsideration.109 The court rejected both NAS’s and LADWP’s arguments,
stating that they were arguing, respectively, either that the public trust doctrine
displaces the statutory water rights laws or that the public trust doctrine plays no
103. NAS brought its action in the Mono County Superior Court, and the action was transferred
to the Alpine County Superior Court. Id. at 712. After LADWP filed a cross-complaint against several
parties, including the United States, the United States removed the action to the federal courts. Id. The
federal district court abstained on grounds that the action raised state law claims rather than federal
claims and directed NAS to file its action in state court. Id. NAS then filed a new action in the Alpine
County Superior Court, and, after the Superior Court ruled against NAS’s claim, NAS then filed a petition
for writ of mandate in the California Supreme Court seeking review its claim, which the Supreme Court
granted. See generally id. at 716–18.
104. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 715–16, 726–27; National Audubon Society’s Memorandum
of Points and Authorities at 26–62, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d 709 (No. 24368) (on file with author).
105. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 726–27; Los Angeles Dep’t of Water and Power’s
Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 18–46, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d 709 (No. 24368) (on
file with author).
106. CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 2021) (“It is hereby declared to be the established policy of this
State that the use of water for domestic purposes is the highest use of water and that the next highest
use is for irrigation.”).
107. State of California Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 18–54, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y,
658 P.2d 709 (No. 24368) (on file with author).
108. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 732.
109. Id.
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role in the regulation of water rights, and that the court was “unable to accept
either position.”110
The California Supreme Court described more specifically how the public
trust doctrine applies to the state’s regulation of water rights, stating:
• Under the public trust doctrine, the state as sovereign retains “continuing
supervisory control” over its navigable waters and the underlying lands.111
Thus, no one has a “vested right” to appropriate water in a manner
harmful to the public trust.112
• As a matter of “current and historical necessity,” the Legislature, or its
designated agency the State Water Board, is authorized to approve
licenses and permits to appropriate water even though this “does not
promote, and may unavoidably harm” trust uses in the source stream.113
• Nonetheless, the state has “an affirmative duty to take the public trust into
account in the planning and allocation of water resources” and to “protect
public trust uses whenever feasible.”114 The state must, however, preserve
public trust uses only to the extent “consistent with the public interest.”115
• Once the state has approved an appropriation, the state has “a duty of
continuing supervision” over the taking and use of the appropriated water
and is “not confined by past allocation decisions,” which “may be incorrect
in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.”116
Accordingly, the state may “reconsider allocation decisions” and impose
new conditions “even though those decisions were made after due
consideration of their effect on the public trust.”117
National Audubon also held that the public trust doctrine applies not only
to navigable waters but also to nonnavigable tributaries of such waters because
diversions from tributaries can cause harm to public trust uses in the navigable
waters themselves.118 Thus, the court held that the doctrine applies to LADWP’s
diversions from the Mono Lake tributaries.119
The California Supreme Court also noted that it had held in earlier mining
cases that, under the state’s nuisance statutes, the state holds “the absolute right
to all navigable waters and the soils under them,” and that mining activities that
altered the bed of a river and impeded navigation or the public’s access to the

110. Id. at 727, 732.
111. Id. at 727.
112. Id. at 726, 728.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 728.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 719–21.
119. Id.
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waters are nuisances and thus unlawful.120 Although the earlier mining decisions
were based on legislatively-enacted nuisance statutes, National Audubon viewed
the decisions as establishing a predicate for the court’s conclusion that the common
law public trust doctrine protects public interests in regulation of water.
In sum, National Audubon held that the state must consider public trust
uses in planning and managing the state’s navigable waters and their tributaries,
and in granting permits to appropriate water. The state is not required necessarily
to preserve public trust uses but only to consider public trust uses in regulating use
of water. The state is required to preserve public trust uses if “feasible,” however,
unless this is inconsistent with the “public interest.”121 As a matter of “current and
historical necessity” the state may approve water diversions even though this may
impair trust uses in source streams.122 Once the state has granted an appropriative
water right permit, the state has a duty of continuing supervision over the permit,
and may impose additional conditions in the permit to protect public trust uses;
thus, no one has a vested right to use water adversely to the public trust.123
IV. NEVADA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MINERAL COUNTY
In Mineral County v. Lyon County, et al.,124 the Nevada Supreme Court in
2020 considered whether the public trust doctrine authorizes restriction,
modification or cancellation—in a word, reallocation—of water rights that have
been adjudicated by the courts in order to provide water for public trust uses. The
court, ruling en banc, held that the public trust doctrine does not authorize
reallocation of adjudicated water rights, and deferred to the Nevada Legislature’s

120. Id. at 720 (first citing People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1159 (Cal. 1884); and
then citing People ex rel. Robarts v. Russ, 64 P. 111, 112 (Cal. 1901)). Under the California statutes, a
“nuisance” is anything that “unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use . . . of any navigable lake, or
river, bay, stream, canal, or basin . . .,” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2021), and a “public nuisance” is one
that affects “any considerable number of persons.” Id. § 3480.
121. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728.
122. Id. at 726, 728.
123. In post-National Audubon cases, the California courts have stated that National Audubon
held that the state is required only to consider but not necessarily preserve public trust uses in regulating
water. California v. Superior Ct. of Riverside County, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 286 n. 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000);
Carstens v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 135, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see Casitas Mun. Water
Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 459, 461 (2011). National Audubon was followed by the Hawaiian
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 444–45, 452–54 (Haw.
2000), although, because Hawaii is not an arid or semiarid state like the continental western states that
follow the doctrine of prior appropriation, the Hawaiian Supreme Court’s decision would seem to have
only limited value in integrating the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights laws of the
continental western states.
124. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 421.
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judgment that finality of the water rights serves Nevada’s public interest by
promoting development of water resources necessary to meet the public’s present
and future needs.125 The court declined to follow the California Supreme Court’s
decision in National Audubon.126
In the case, Mineral County, a county in Nevada, brought an action in a
federal district court in Nevada against several water users who had adjudicated
water rights in the Walker River. Mineral County claimed that their water rights
were reducing inflows into Walker Lake, where the river terminates, thus causing
harm to public trust uses in the lake, which consisted primarily of a fishery and
recreational uses.127 The Walker River is an interstate river that originates in
California and flows into Nevada.128 The defendant water users’ rights had been
adjudicated in a judicial decree, the Walker River Decree, which had been issued
many decades earlier, in the 1930s.129
Mineral County argued that Nevada’s public trust doctrine required the
district court to modify the Walker River Decree to reallocate the water users’
adjudicated rights in order to provide additional inflows into Walker Lake.130
Mineral County’s public trust claim relied heavily on the California Supreme Court’s
decision in National Audubon.131 The defendant water users argued variously that
the public trust doctrine does not apply to appropriative water rights, or at least
not to appropriative water rights that have been adjudicated in judicial decrees,
or—if the doctrine does apply—that the doctrine does not authorize reallocation of
the adjudicated rights.132 Thus, the issue raised in Mineral County was whether the
public trust doctrine authorizes reallocation of adjudicated water rights to provide
water for public trust uses.
The district court rejected Mineral County’s public trust claim, ruling that
the public trust doctrine applies prospectively to the state’s future issuance of
appropriative permits but not retrospectively to water rights that have already
been adjudicated, and that—if the doctrine did apply—this would result in an
unconstitutional taking of the water users’ property rights.133
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the public trust
issue is one of Nevada law and not federal law, and therefore that the issue should
be decided by the Nevada Supreme Court. 134 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit certified
to the Nevada Supreme Court the question whether the public trust doctrine

125. Id. at 431.
126. Id. at 430 n.10.
127. Id. at 422–24.
128. Id. at 422.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 421.
131. See Nat’l Audubon, 33 Cal.3d at 726–28.
132. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 429.
133. Mineral County v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 900 F.3d 1027, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2018).
134. Id.
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applies to water rights that have been adjudicated and settled under the
appropriation doctrine.135 The Ninth Circuit also certified the question whether the
public trust doctrine, if applied to such water rights, would result in a “taking” of
property requiring payment of compensation under the Nevada Constitution.136
Responding to the first certified question, the Nevada Supreme Court held
that the public trust doctrine applies to adjudicated water rights, but does not
authorize reallocation of the rights to provide water for public trust uses. 137 Since
the court held that the public trust doctrine does not authorize reallocation of the
rights, the court did not reach the second certified question of whether reallocation
would result in a “taking” of property.138
In answering the first question, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that the
public trust doctrine, first recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Martin v.
Waddell and expanded in its “seminal” decision in Illinois Central,139 provides that
the state holds its navigable waters and underlying lands in trust for the public, and
requires that the state regulate the waters and lands in the public interest.140 The
public trust doctrine derives not only from the common law, the court stated, but
also from Nevada’s Constitution and statutes, and from the “inherent limitations”
on the state’s sovereignty established in Illinois Central.141 Citing Illinois Central, the
court stated that the state cannot use water for any purpose, but instead only for
purposes that “comport with the public’s interest”; the state is “simply without
power” to dispose of public trust property when it is not in the public interest.142
The public trust doctrine, the court stated, is based on the same principle that
underlies Nevada’s constitutional gift clause,143 which prohibits gifts of public funds,
because both the public trust doctrine and the gift clause provide that the state acts
as a fiduciary for the public when administering and disposing of the public’s
135. Id. at 1034.
136. Id.
137. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 421–22. The Nevada Supreme Court rephrased the question
certified by the Ninth Circuit—whether the public trust doctrine “applies” to adjudicated water rights—
to read whether the doctrine “permits reallocating” of the rights. Id. Although the Nevada Supreme
Court held that the doctrine “applies” to adjudicated rights, the court apparently assumed, correctly,
that the Ninth Circuit wanted to know whether the doctrine authorizes reallocation of the rights,
because Mineral County contended that the doctrine authorizes such reallocation. If the Nevada
Supreme Court had simply held that the doctrine “applies” to the rights, the court would not have
answered the question that the Ninth Circuit had in mind in certifying the issue to the Nevada Supreme
Court.
138. Id. at 430.
139. Id. at 424 (first citing Martin, 41 U.S. 367, and then citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387).
140. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 423–25.
141. Id. at 424.
142. Id. at 425.
143. NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 9.
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valuable property, and cannot dispose of the property except when in the public
interest.144
The Nevada Supreme Court also held that the Legislature’s statutory
system for regulation of water rights “incorporates” the public trust doctrine, by
“giving force” to the “constitutional and inherent limitations” on the state’s
authority that protect the “public interest” in the waters of the state. 145 The
Legislature’s statutory system incorporates the public trust doctrine, the court
reasoned, because the statutory system provides that water “belongs to the
public”; requires that water may be used only for a “beneficial use,” which is
defined as a “public use”; provides that a water right ceases to exist when the water
is no longer put to beneficial use; and requires the State Engineer, who administers
the statutory water rights system, to consider the “public interest” in granting
appropriative water rights permits.146 The court stated that the Legislature’s
statutory system of regulation does not “supersede” the public trust doctrine, but
instead represents the Legislature’s application of the doctrine to water rights. 147
The court also held that the public trust doctrine applies to all waters in the state,
navigable or nonnavigable,148 which is consistent with National Audubon’s view that
the doctrine applies to tributaries of navigable waters. 149
Turning to water rights adjudicated in judicial decrees, the court stated
that the public trust doctrine applies to adjudicated water rights, and that
adjudicated rights must be based on public trust principles, such as that water may
be used only for a beneficial use and in the public interest.150 The court also ruled,
however, that the Legislature has expressly provided in the statutory laws that
appropriative water rights that have been adjudicated in final judicial decrees are

144. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 424.
145. Id. at 431; id. at 424 (“[T]he Legislature effectively codified the principles behind the public
trust doctrine . . . ” in enacting the statutory water rights laws).
146. Id. at 426–27.
147. Id. at 429 n.7.
148. Id. at 425–26.
149. The Nevada Supreme Court, in holding that the public trust doctrine applies to “all waters
within the state, whether navigable or nonnavigable,” seemingly implied that the doctrine applies to
groundwater. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 425. In National Audubon, on the other hand, the California
Supreme Court stated that the public trust doctrine applies to surface waters and their tributaries, but
specifically declined to consider whether the doctrine applies to groundwater. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y , 658
P.2d at 721 n.19. Subsequent to National Audubon, a California Court of Appeal held that the public trust
doctrine applies to groundwater to the extent that activities in groundwater may affect public trust uses
in navigable surface waters. Env’t Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal. Rptr.3d 393, 406
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
150. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 425.
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final and conclusive and not subject to reallocation. 151 This statutory principle is
consistent with public trust principles, the court stated, because it ensures the
development of water for the public’s present and future needs; these public
needs, the court stated, include water for irrigation, power, municipal supply,
mining, storage, recreation and other purposes—all of which benefit the people of
Nevada and boost its economy.152 The court described these public needs more
fully, stating:
Municipal, social, and economic institutions rely on the finality of
water rights for long-term planning and capital investments.
Likewise, agricultural and mining industries rely on the finality of
water for capital and output, which derivatively impacts other
business and influences the prosperity of the state. To permit
reallocation would create uncertainties for future development
in Nevada and undermine the public interest in finality and thus
also the management of these resources consistent with the
public trust doctrine.153
The court, stating that “recognition of finality is vital in arid states like
Nevada,” also cited the United States Supreme Court’s statement in a water rights
dispute between Arizona and California that “[c]ertainty of rights is particularly
important with respect to water rights in the Western United States,” and that
“[t]he doctrine of prior appropriation . . . is itself largely a product of the compelling
need for certainty in the holding and use of water rights.”154
The Nevada Supreme Court also stated that its conclusion that adjudicated
water rights are non-reallocable is supported by the court’s prior decision in
Lawrence v. Clark County, 155 which established a three-part test in determining
whether the Legislature may dispose of a public trust resource; under this test, the
Legislature may dispose of a trust resource only if the disposition is for a public
purpose, the state receives fair consideration, and the state maintains the trust for

151. Id. at 429 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.210(1) (2020)) (“The decree entered by the court . . .
shall be final and conclusive upon all persons and rights lawfully embraced within the adjudication.”); id.
§ 533.0245 (“The State Engineer shall not carry out his or her duties . . . in a manner that conflicts with
any applicable provision of a decree or order issued by a state or federal court.”).
152. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 429.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 429 (citing Arizona v. California, 60 U.S. 605, 620 (1983)). The Nevada Supreme Court
had previously declared that “[t]he public welfare is very greatly interested in the largest economic use
of the waters of the state for agricultural, mining, power and other purposes.” Application of Filippini,
202 P.2d 535, 539 (Nev. 1949) (quoting Ormsby County v. Kearney, 142 P. 803, 805 (Nev. 1914)).
155. Lawrence v. Clark County, 254 P.3d 606, 617 (Nev. 2011).
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present and future generations.156 Mineral County held that its decision is
consistent with this three-part test because water may be used only for a beneficial
use, which is a public use; the public receives fair consideration by gaining the
benefit of water allocations for irrigation, power and other such uses; and the trust
will be maintained for present and future generations by providing for development
of water to meet the public’s present and future needs.157
The Nevada Supreme Court declined to follow the California Supreme
Court’s decision in National Audubon, stating that National Audubon would
“diminish the stability of prior allocations” and “detract from the simultaneous
operation of both prior appropriation and the public trust doctrine.158 Although the
Nevada Supreme Court recognized the “tragic decline of Walker Lake,” the court
stated that it could not “use the public trust doctrine as a tool to uproot an entire
water system, particularly where finality is firmly rooted in our statutes.”159
In sum, Mineral County held that—although the public trust doctrine applies
to adjudicated water rights and provides that the rights must be based on the public
interest—the doctrine does not authorize reallocation of adjudicated rights to
provide water for public trust uses because the Legislature has determined that
finality of the rights is in Nevada’s public interest by ensuring development of water
supplies for the public’s present and future needs. The court thus deferred to the
Legislature’s judgment that finality of adjudicated water rights is in the public
interest, and held that the public trust does not mandate a contrary result by
authorizing reallocation of the rights.
V. COMPARISON OF MINERAL COUNTY AND NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY
The Nevada Supreme Court’s and the California Supreme Court’s respective
interpretations of the public trust doctrine in Mineral County and National Audubon
are similar in many important respects. Both decisions hold that the state possesses
sovereign interests in navigable waters and underlying lands that are held in trust
for the public. Both hold that the state has a public trust duty to regulate the waters
and lands in the public interest, and not solely in the interests of the water users.
Both hold that the public trust doctrine applies to existing water rights—including,
in Mineral County, water rights that have been adjudicated by the courts. Both hold
that the public trust doctrine applies not only to navigable waters, but also to
nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters.160
But the Mineral County and National Audubon decisions diverge in other
significant respects, and establish two different and conflicting views of the public
trust doctrine.

156. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 427–28.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 430 n.10.
159. Id. at 430.
160. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 425 n.4; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 719–22.

2022

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: THE NEVADA AND
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURTS' DIVERGENT VIEWS
IN MINERAL COUNTY AND NATIONAL AUDUBON
SOCIETY

185

A. Reallocation of Water Rights
First, and most obviously, Mineral County and National Audubon diverge
on whether the public trust doctrine authorizes reallocation of water rights, at least
water rights that have been adjudicated by the courts as in Mineral County. Mineral
County held that while the public trust doctrine applies to adjudicated water rights,
the doctrine does not authorize reallocation of the rights. Mineral County reasoned
that the public trust doctrine requires the Legislature to regulate water in the public
interest, and that the Legislature fulfilled its public trust responsibility in
determining that finality of adjudicated rights is in the public interest—and
therefore the public trust doctrine does not establish separate duties that override
the legislative judgment.161
National Audubon, on the other hand, held that the public trust doctrine
not only applies to existing water rights, but also requires the state to exercise
continuing supervisory authority over the rights, with authority to modify and
reallocate the rights to provide water for public trust uses.162 National Audubon
flatly held that the public trust doctrine authorizes “reallocation of the allocation of
waters.”163
Thus, Mineral County held that the public interest is served by finality of
adjudicated water rights because finality ensures that water will be available for the
public’s present and future needs, and National Audubon held, conversely, that the
public interest is served by reallocability of water rights because reallocability
ensures that public trust uses will be preserved for present and future generations.
The decisions thus fundamentally diverge on the nature of the public interest
served by the public trust doctrine, in terms of whether the public interest is served
by finality of water rights or by preservation of public trust uses.
Arguably, Mineral County and National Audubon might be distinguished
and reconciled on grounds that neither decision directly addressed the reallocation
issue decided by the other. Although Mineral County held that adjudicated water
rights cannot be reallocated, Mineral County did not specifically address whether
other types of water rights—such as water rights based on permits issued by the
State Engineer under the state’s appropriative water rights system—are also
precluded from reallocation. Conversely, although National Audubon held that the
State Water Board, which administers California’s statutory water rights system,
has continuing supervisory authority over its permits and may reallocate the rights
to protect public trust uses, National Audubon did not specifically address whether
water rights adjudicated by the courts—a different branch of government—are also
subject to reallocation, either by the State Water Board or other authorities. Since
Mineral County and National Audubon addressed the reallocation issue in different
161. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 425–30.
162. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727–29.
163. Id. at 737.
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contexts—Mineral County in the context of court-adjudicated rights and National
Audubon in the context of state-issued permits—the decisions might, arguably, be
viewed as reconcilable and not in conflict.
More likely, however, the decisions embrace two different views of the
public interest served by the public trust doctrine and cannot be distinguished.
Mineral County apparently viewed water rights recognized under state law as final
and conclusive and not subject to reallocation, regardless of whether the rights are
based on judicial decrees or state-issued permits. Mineral County stated that the
Legislature has determined that finality of water rights is in Nevada’s public interest
by ensuring availability of water for Nevada’s vital present and future needs, such
as for irrigation, domestic use, hydropower, and other such uses.164 “[T]o permit
reallocation,” the court held, “would create uncertainties for future development
in Nevada and undermine the public interest in finality and thus also the
management of these resources consistent with the public trust doctrine.” 165 The
court favorably cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision stating that “[c]ertainty of
rights is particularly important with respect to water rights in the Western United
States.”166 Mineral County expressly declined to follow National Audubon, which it
viewed as “diminish[ing] the stability of prior appropriations.”167 Thus, Mineral
County appeared to regard finality of water rights as having a very high public value
regardless of the source of the rights, such as whether they are based on judicial
decrees or state-issued permits.
By contrast, National Audubon held that protection of instream public
trust uses, such as Mono Lake’s ecological values, is a very high public value and
appeared to regard the preservation of these instream public trust uses as having a
higher value than other uses of water. National Audubon held that public trust uses
must be preserved if “feasible”; that the state has an “affirmative duty” to consider
public trust uses in planning and allocation of water resources, and a “duty of
continuing supervision” over water rights in order to protect public trust uses; and
that the state is not bound by past water allocation decisions but instead may
reconsider them to protect public trust uses.168 Although the Nevada Supreme
Court had held in another case that a state-based water right, whether based on a
state permit or actual appropriation of water, is a “vested right” protected by
constitutional guaranties,169 National Audubon held that no one has a “vested right”
to use water in a manner harmful to public trust uses.170
Thus, Mineral County regarded finality of water rights as having a very high
public value even though this may adversely affect public trust uses, and National

164. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 429.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Arizona, 460 U.S. at 620).
167. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 430 n.10.
168. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727–28.
169. Application of Filippini, 202 P.2d 539, 537 (Nev. 1949).
170. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 732.
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Audubon conversely regarded public trust uses as having a very high public value
even though this may limit the finality of water rights. Because the decisions
diverge on the relative importance of these public values, their divergence
apparently does not depend on the source of the water rights in question.
B. Relationship Between Public Trust Doctrine and Statutory Water Rights Laws
Mineral County and National Audubon also diverge more broadly on the
nature and scope of the public trust doctrine itself, in terms of the relationship
between the common law doctrine and the statutory water rights laws. The
question is whether the public trust doctrine is a separate body of common law that
exists independently of the statutory water rights laws and must be integrated by
the courts into the statutory laws, or instead whether the doctrine, although not by
name, is already incorporated and integrated in the statutory laws. The question,
then, is whether the courts should fashion common law principles that apply to and
bind the legislative judgment in regulating water rights, or should instead defer to
the legislative judgment in regulating the rights.
i. Whether Public Trust Doctrine Is Separate from, or Instead Incorporated in,
Statutory Laws; Deference to Legislative Judgment
In Mineral County, the Nevada Supreme Court viewed the public trust
doctrine and the statutory water rights laws as part of a unified and comprehensive
system for regulation of water rights, in that the statutory laws codify and
incorporate public trust principles.171 The Court held that the public trust doctrine
requires that the state regulate water rights in the public interest, and that the
Legislature fulfilled its public trust responsibilities by enacting a statutory system in
the public interest; as the Court noted, the statutory laws provide that the state’s
waters are owned by the public, that water may only be used for a beneficial use,
which is a public use, and that the State Engineer must consider the public interest
in issuing permits to appropriate water.172 Based on this predicate, the Court
deferred to the Legislature’s judgment that finality of adjudicated water rights is in
the public interest, because finality ensures that water will be available for the
public’s present and future needs, and the Court concluded that the public trust
doctrine does not mandate a contrary result by authorizing reallocation of
adjudicated rights.173 Thus, Mineral County, rather than establishing common law
principles that potentially override the legislative judgment, deferred to the
legislative judgment that finality of the rights is in the public interest.

171. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 424 (“codified”), 431 (“incorporates”).
172. Id. at 426–31.
173. Id.
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Mineral County did not entirely defer to the legislative judgment, however.
Mineral County, citing its earlier decision in Lawrence v. Clark County,174 held that
the state may dispose of a public trust resource only under limited circumstances—
if the disposition is for a public purpose, the state receives fair consideration, and
the state maintains the resource for present and future generations.175 Mineral
County then held that the Legislature’s judgment that adjudicated water rights are
final and non-reallocable is consistent with this three-part test.176 Thus, while
Mineral County generally deferred to the legislative judgment that finality of water
rights is in the public interest, Mineral County also held that the legislative judgment
is consistent with the Court’s previously-established public trust principles.
National Audubon, on the other hand, stated that the statutory water
rights laws and the public trust doctrine “exist[] independently of each other” and
are on a “collision course,” and must be “integrate[d]” in a way that gives meaning
to both.177 Thus, National Audubon viewed the public trust doctrine as a body of
common law that is separate and distinct from, and in potential conflict with, the
statutory laws, and that must be integrated by the Court into the statutory laws.
Based on this predicate, National Audubon fashioned public trust principles that
apply to and bind the legislative judgment in regulating water rights. 178
In fashioning these principles, National Audubon acknowledged that
California’s statutory laws provide that “domestic use” is “the highest use of water
in the State,”179 which was the basis for the State Water Board’s 1940 decision that
issued an appropriative permit to Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.
National Audubon stated that the statutory priority for domestic use must be read
in conjunction with “judicial decisions explaining the policy embodied in the public
174. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 427–29 (citing Lawrence v. Clark County, 254 P.3d 606, 616 (Nev.
2011)).
175. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 427–29. In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court held that the state
can dispose of public trust resources in lands underlying navigable waters if such disposition
“promote[s]” the public interest. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453. On the other hand, the California
Supreme Court ruled, in a case decided shortly before National Audubon, that the state can dispose of
trust property in lands underlying navigable waters, such as tidelands, only if the lands are “substantially
valueless” for trust purposes. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 374 (Cal. 1980). Thus,
while Mineral County and Illinois Central held that the state can dispose of trust resources under some
circumstances if the disposition is in the public interest, the California Supreme Court in City of Berkeley
held that the state can dispose of trust resources only if the lands are no longer capable of serving trust
uses.
176. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 427–29.
177. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 712, 732.
178. Id. at 727–28.
179. Id. at 713 (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 1254 (West 2021) (“In acting upon applications to
appropriate water the board shall be guided by the policy that domestic use is the highest use and
irrigation is the next highest use of water.”). _See also CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 2021) (“It is hereby
declared to be the established policy of this State that the use of water for domestic purposes is the
highest use of water and that the next highest use is for irrigation.”).
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trust doctrine,” which limit the Legislature’s statutory priority.180 National Audubon
then stated, without citation of authority, that the state is required to preserve
public trust uses if “feasible.” 181 Thus, while the Legislature provided that domestic
use is the highest priority of water use in California, National Audubon instead held
that public trust uses, if “feasible,” are the highest priority, because the legislative
priority must be read in conjunction with the court’s own decisions establishing
priorities of use. National Audubon also stated that the public trust doctrine
precludes “the possibility that statutory protections [of public trust uses] can be
repealed,”182 thus indicating that the Legislature is powerless to repeal its own
statutes that may protect public trust uses. National Audubon thus established
public trust principles that apply to and bind, and even override, the legislative
judgment in regulating water rights.
Additionally, National Audubon held that the public trust doctrine requires
that the state exercise continuing authority over water rights, with authority to
impose additional conditions in the rights and even revoke them, to protect public
trust uses.183 California’s statutory laws, on the other hand, authorize the State
Water Board to exercise continuing authority over its water right permits only
under defined and limited circumstances, none of which relate to public trust
uses.184 Thus, while the statutory laws authorize the State Water Board to exercise
continuing authority over water rights under defined and limited circumstances,
National Audubon held that the public trust doctrine authorizes the Board to
exercise continuing authority over water rights to protect public trust uses if
“feasible.” Although the issue of whether the state has continuing authority over
water rights to protect public trust uses involves an important issue of the state’s
public policy in regulating water rights, National Audubon decided this significant
policy issue itself rather than allowing the Legislature to decide it.
Thus, while Mineral County viewed the public trust doctrine and the
statutory laws as part of a unified and comprehensive system of regulation, and
180. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 729 n.30.
181. Id. at 728.
182. Id. at 728 n.27.
183. Id. at 727–28.
184. The State Water Board is authorized to reserve jurisdiction over a permit if sufficient
information is not available to establish final terms and conditions of the permit, or if the permit
application relates to only part of a coordinated project. CAL. WATER CODE § 1394 (West 2021); see United
States v. State Water Res. Cont. Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 102, 150 (Cal. 1986) (holding that State Water
Board has reserved jurisdiction to impose additional conditions in appropriative water right permits
issued to federal Central Valley Project and State Water Project). The State Water Board may revoke a
permit if the permittee has not proceeded with due diligence to put water to beneficial use, CAL. WATER
CODE § 1410, or if the permitted works are not in conformity with the statutory or regulatory laws, or
with the terms of the permit. Id. § 1611. The State Water Board cannot reserve jurisdiction over a license,
however. Id. § 1394.
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deferred to the legislative judgment that finality of adjudicated rights is in the public
interest, National Audubon viewed the public trust doctrine and the statutory laws
as different bodies of law that are on a “collision course” and must be integrated
by the courts into a unified system of regulation. While National Audubon
integrated public trust principles into the statutory laws, Mineral County held that
public trust principles are already integrated into the statutory laws.
Although National Audubon defined public trust principles separately from
the statutory laws, certain passages in National Audubon indicate that the
Legislature is ultimately responsible for regulating water rights and determining the
appropriate balance between public trust uses and other uses of water. National
Audubon stated that as a matter of “current and historical necessity” the state may
approve water diversions even though the diversions may “unavoidably impair”
trust uses in source streams.185 National Audubon stated that the state, in
regulating water rights, is required only to consider—but not necessarily preserve—
public trust uses, at least if the trust uses are not “feasible.”186 National Audubon
stated that public trust uses must yield when in conflict with public interest
standards established under the constitutional and statutory laws; the Court stated
that “all uses of water, including public trust uses, must conform to the standard of
reasonable use” established under the California Constitution, 187 and that the state
must preserve public trust uses only to the extent “consistent with the public
interest” as established under the statutory laws. 188 These passages suggest,
contrary to other passages in National Audubon, that the courts should defer to the
legislative judgment rather than adopt common law rules that override it.
In pre-National Audubon cases involving tidelands and other lands
underlying navigable waters, the California Supreme Court held that the legislature
is responsible for administering the public trust and that its judgment is
“conclusive.”189 The court in some such cases upheld the legislature’s authorization
of activities in navigable waters and underlying lands that promoted commerce—a
recognized public trust use—even though the activities impaired other trust uses,
such as navigation and fisheries.190 These decisions suggest that the courts should

185. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727.
186. Id. at 728.
187. Id. at 725 (citing CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2) (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 728.
189. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 437 n. 17 (Cal. 1970); Mallon v. City of Long
Beach, 282 P.2d 481, 486 (Cal. 1955); see Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971) (“It is a political
question, within the wisdom and power of the Legislature, acting within the scope of its duties as trustee,
to determine whether public trust uses should be modified or extinguished.”).
190. Colberg, Inc. v. California, 432 P.2d 3, 10 (Cal. 1967); Boone v. Kingsbury, 273 P. 797, 812
(Cal. 1928). In Colberg, Inc. v. California, the California Supreme Court upheld a legislative enactment
authorizing construction of a bridge over a navigable waterway, even though the bridge impaired
navigation by preventing ships from having access to shipyard facilities. Colberg, Inc., 432 P.2d at 10. The
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defer to the legislature’s “conclusive” judgment in regulating water rights, rather
than adopt common law principles that limit or override the legislative judgment.
National Audubon appears consistent with these earlier decisions in stating that as
a matter of “current and historical necessity” the state may authorize water
diversions that impair public trust uses in source streams,191 but not in stating, for
example, that “feasible” public trust uses have higher priority than domestic uses
that the legislature regarded as having the highest priority.192
Subsequently to National Audubon, the California Supreme Court
appeared to rule in another case that if a statute defines a state agency’s regulatory
duties, then the agency’s regulatory duties are defined by the statute rather than
the common law public trust doctrine. In Environmental Protection & Information
Center v. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (EPIC),193 an
environmental plaintiff brought an action against the California Department of Fish
and Game (DFG), alleging that DFG’s issuance of an incidental take permit under
the California Endangered Species Act (CESA) violated both CESA and the public
trust doctrine. The California Supreme Court held that DFG’s permit violated CESA
but not the public trust doctrine.194 The court stated that there are “two distinct
public trust doctrines,” one the “common law” doctrine described by National
Audubon and the other based on the “statute,” i.e., CESA, that defined the agency’s
duties, and that it would look to the statute and not the common law doctrine to
determine whether the agency had violated its regulatory duties. 195 EPIC appears
consistent with the California Supreme Court’s pre-National Audubon decisions
holding that the Legislature exercises “conclusive” judgment in administering the
public trust, and appears at least to be in tension with passages in National Audubon
stating that the public trust doctrine may limit and override the legislative

Court stated that the bridge was necessary for the state’s commercial development, and that “the state,
as trustee for benefit of the people, has power to deal with its navigable waters in any manner consistent
with the improvement of commercial intercourse, whether navigational or otherwise.” Id. at 10.
Similarly, in Boone v. Kingsbury, the California Supreme Court held that the state was authorized to issue
permits for exploration of gas and oil in tidal or submerged lands, because the explorations were vital to
California’s and the nation’s commerce, in that gasoline “is a mover of commerce and fills the office of
‘a public benefit.’” Boone, 273 P. at 812. The state’s judgment, the Court stated, is “conclusive” in such
matters. Id. at 813.
191. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727.
192. Id. at 728.
193. 187 P.3d 888 (Cal. 2008).
194. Id. at 925–26.
195. Id.
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judgment, such as the legislative judgment that domestic use of water is the highest
priority of use.196
ii. Protection of Public Trust Uses Under California’s Constitutional and Statutory
Laws
National Audubon—in stating that the statutory water rights laws and the
public trust doctrine are a “collision course” and must be “integrate[d]”—appeared
not to fully consider the extent to which the water rights laws of California and
other western states provide significant protection of the public interest in
regulation of water and thus incorporate the principles on which the public trust
doctrine is based.
As noted earlier, California’s constitutional and statutory water rights laws,
like the laws of many other western states, provide that water may only be used
for uses that are generally regarded as beneficial to the public.197 More specifically,
the California Constitution provides that all water rights in California are subject to
the rule of reasonable and beneficial use, generally referred to as the rule of
reasonable use.198 As National Audubon recognized, the rule of reasonable use
“establishes state water policy” and applies to public trust uses.199 The rule of
reasonable use applies to all water rights in California, including both appropriative
and riparian rights in surface waters,200 as well as rights in groundwater.201 Thus, a
recognized water right must not only be beneficial to the public, but must also be
reasonable in light of competing uses dependent on the same water resource. The
California Supreme Court has held that the rule of reasonable use requires the
state, in regulating water rights, to consider “statewide issues of transcendent
196. In Env’t L. Found. v. State Water Res. Cont. Bd. (ELF), 26 Cal.App.5th 844 (2018), the California
Court of Appeal stated that EPIC is distinguishable from National Audubon because EPIC “is not a water
rights case” and instead involved “the public trust in wildlife”; the regulation of wildlife, the court stated,
is “primarily statutory” and thus distinguishable from the public trust in water, “which is based on the
common law.” In fact, the public trust doctrine is a common law doctrine as applied to both wildlife and
water, because the doctrine is not provided for in the statutes applicable to either, and indeed water is
regulated by the statutes as much as, and in fact more than, wildlife is regulated by the statutes. See,
e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200 (West 2021) (establishing comprehensive statutory requirements
applicable to State Water Board’s regulation of water rights). Thus, there appears little basis for ELF’s
distinction between wildlife and water in terms of the relationship between the common law public trust
doctrine and the Legislature’s statutes.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 50–63.
198. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 3; CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2021).
199. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 725.
200. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 892–96 (Cal. 1967); Peabody v. City of Vallejo,
40 P.2d 486, 491, 498–99 (Cal. 1935); People ex rel. State Water Res. Cont. Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal.App.3d
743, 750–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Light v. State Water Res. Cont. Bd., 226 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1479–80
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
201. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 862–63 (Cal. 2000).

2022

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: THE NEVADA AND
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURTS' DIVERGENT VIEWS
IN MINERAL COUNTY AND NATIONAL AUDUBON
SOCIETY

193

importance,” such as “the ever increasing need for conservation of water in this
state.”202 Additionally, California’s statutory laws, like those of other western
states, require that water rights must be consistent with the “public interest.” 203
California’s State Water Board may issue an appropriative permit only if the
proposed use is in the “public interest” and may impose conditions in the permit to
protect the “public interest.”204 California’s statutory laws also provide that “[a]ll
water within the State is the property of the people of the State,” 205 thus
incorporating the public trust principle that navigable waters belong to the public
rather than the water user.
Thus, although California’s water rights laws do not explicitly incorporate
the public trust doctrine as such,206 they provide significant protection of the public
interest that is the objective of the doctrine as described in Illinois Central and its
progeny. The public trust doctrine and the constitutional and statutory laws may
not be on the “collision course” depicted by National Audubon, because the
constitutional and statutory laws provide significant accommodation and inclusion
of the foundational principles of the doctrine.
This suggests that National Audubon might have reached the same result
in protecting public trust resources in Mono Lake by holding that the State Water
Board was authorized under the constitutional and statutory laws to reconsider
LADWP’s water right permit and impose conditions to protect the trust resources,
rather than by invoking common law public trust principles that had never been
applied to regulation of water. In fact, the California courts have held that under
the rule of reasonable use, as codified in the California Constitution and the
statutes, the State Water Board is authorized to take action to prevent water uses
that are not reasonable and beneficial. 207 In National Audubon, the State of
California argued that under the rule of reasonable use and accompanying statutes,
the State Water Board was authorized to reconsider LADWP’s appropriative permit
and impose additional conditions to protect public trust uses in Mono Lake. 208
National Audubon disregarded the argument, stating that it “need not resolve that
202. Joslin, 429 P.2d at 894–95.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 50–63.
204. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255, 1257 (West 2021); see supra text accompanying note 62.
205. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1943).
206. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1120, 85023 (West 2021). Subsequently to National Audubon, the
California Legislature amended the Water Code to generally provide that its provisions apply to State
Board decisions based on the public trust doctrine, but without otherwise specifying how the doctrine
may apply to regulation of water rights. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1120, 85023 (West 2021).
207. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d at 750–51 (holding that under rule of reasonable use the State Board
is authorized to take action and adopt regulation limiting water diversions for frost protection); Light,
226 Cal. App. 4th at 1479–80 (same); see CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 2021) (authorizing State Board to
take judicial action to prevent “unreasonable use” of water).
208. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728 n.28.
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controversy” because it relied on the public trust doctrine to reach its result.209
Perhaps National Audubon might have rested on a sounder jurisprudential footing
if the decision were based on recognized constitutional and statutory principles
rather than not previously applied common law principles, particularly if it could
have reached the same result under the former approach.
In fact, National Audubon’s integration of common law and statutory
principles appears to have resulted in certain incongruities. National Audubon held,
on the one hand, that public trust uses must be protected if “feasible”210 but, on
the other, that public trust uses must be protected only if consistent with the
“public interest,”211 which is the statutory standard that the State Water Board
applies in regulating water rights.212 If, as National Audubon held, public trust uses
must be protected if “feasible” but not if inconsistent with the “public interest”
standard that otherwise applies to water rights, this means that “feasible” public
trust uses would have no meaningful protection at all, because they must always
yield when in conflict with the “public interest” standard that applies to water
rights. Thus, there appears to be a conflict between National Audubon’s common
law “feasible” standard and its statutorily based “public interest” standard. At least
one California court has noted the apparent contradiction and resolved it in favor
of the “public interest” standard; the court rejected a plaintiff’s argument that a
public trust use must be preserved because it was “feasible,” stating that National
Audubon held that public trust uses must be preserved only if “consistent with the
public interest” as determined by the State Water Board.213
Perhaps because National Audubon rested on a common law ground
rather than on constitutional or statutory grounds, National Audubon appears not
to have had a major effect on water rights in California, at least to the extent that
the rights are judicially reviewable. Although National Audubon was originally
hailed by some as establishing a foundational principle of water law that would
have a major impact on regulation of water rights, California’s constitutional and
statutory water rights laws weave such a comprehensive and extensive web of
regulation of water rights that little room is left for application of judicially
fashioned common law principles.214 The California courts, in determining whether
the State Water Board has properly exercised its duties in regulating water rights,
have generally relied on the statutes defining the Board’s regulatory duties, and
either have not mentioned the public trust doctrine or mentioned it only in

209. Id.
210. Id. at 727.
211. Id. at 728.
212. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255, 1257 (West 2021).
213. State Water Res. Cont. Bd. Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674, 778 (Cal. 2006).
214. See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text.
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passing.215 No California court decision to date appears to have overturned or
limited a State Water Board decision, regulation, or other action on grounds that
the Board has improperly exercised its public trust duties as defined in National
Audubon.216 This appears to be the consequence of California’s comprehensive
statutory system for regulation of water rights.
iii. Separation-of-Powers Principles
The question of whether the courts should defer to the legislative
judgment or instead adopt common law public trust principles that potentially
override the legislative judgment, as addressed in Mineral County and National
Audubon, is suffused with constitutional issues concerning the separation of the
legislative and judicial powers. Under separation-of-powers principles, which are
codified in the constitutions of California and Nevada,217 the legislative branch

215. In the leading case of United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d
82 (Cal. 1986), the California Court of Appeal held that the State Water Board is required under the
statutory laws, including the statutes establishing the rule of reasonable use and the water quality
statutes, to adopt water quality standards in appropriative water rights permits issued to the federal
Central Valley Project and the State Water Project, id. at 115–30, and the court mentioned the public
trust doctrine in passing, id. at 106, but did not rely on the doctrine in reaching its decision. Id. The court
held, however, that the State Water Board has continuing jurisdiction to impose additional conditions
for water rights permits under the California Constitution and statutes, under the permit terms and
conditions themselves, and under the principle established in National Audubon. Id. at 149–50. In State
Water Resources Control Board Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674 (2006), the California Court of Appeal held
that the State Water Board is required to adopt flow standards for protection of salmon under the
statutory laws, and near the end of the decision, rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the Board’s flow
standards violated the public trust doctrine, stating that the Board is required under the statutory laws
to determine whether the flow standards are in the “public interest.” Id. at 777–78. In Light v. State
Water Resources Control Board, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1463 (Cal. 2014), the California Court of Appeal held
that the State Water Board has statutory authority to adopt regulations limiting water diversions for
frost protection of crops, id. at 1481–83, and mentioned the public trust doctrine in passing, id. at 1480,
but did not rely on the doctrine in reaching its decision. Id. In El Dorado Irrigation District v. State Water
Resources Control Board, 142 Cal. App. 4th 937 (Cal. 2006), the California Court of Appeal held that the
State Water Board abused its discretion in amending a permit affecting priority of rights without
amending other permits for the same purpose, id. at 961–66, and mentioned the public trust doctrine
in passing, id. at 966, but did not rely on the doctrine in reaching its decision. Id.
216. In Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Board, 26 Cal. App. 5th
844 (Cal. 2018), the California Court of Appeal, citing National Audubon, held that the public trust
doctrine applies to counties because they are subdivisions of the state, and requires the counties, in
issuing permits for new wells, to determine whether groundwater pumping from the new wells affects
public trust uses in nearby navigable waters. See id. at 867–68.
217. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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exercises the core function of enacting the laws, and the judicial branch exercises
the core function of interpreting the legislative enactments and determining their
constitutionality.218 While these core functions may overlap, in that the actions of
one branch may incidentally and even significantly affect those of the other,219
neither branch may materially impair the inherent functions of the other branch, or
arrogate to itself the other branch’s core functions. 220 As a general rule, the
legislative branch is responsible for establishing the state’s public policy, and the
judicial branch cannot independently evaluate the wisdom of the legislature’s
policy judgments.221
The courts, in exercising their core function of interpreting the laws, would
seem the appropriate institution to determine the broad contours of the public
trust doctrine, in terms of the nature and scope of the state’s duties under the
doctrine. Just as the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central exercised the
judicial function in determining that states have sovereignty over navigable waters
under the equal footing doctrine and are required to regulate the waters in the
public interest,222 the state courts appear to properly exercise the judicial function
of determining whether the state is in fact regulating the waters in the public
interest rather than the private interest. If, for example, a state legislature adopted
a water rights program under which water rights are sold to the highest bidder in
the marketplace without regard to the public interest, the courts might properly
overturn the legislative program because the legislature has failed to regulate water
rights in the public interest. Both Mineral County and National Audubon agreed that
the common law public trust doctrine requires that the state regulate waters in the
public interest.223
In terms of how the state regulates water rights in the public interest,
however, this appears to primarily involve policy judgments that are within the
legislative rather than judicial sphere. In allocating water among competing uses,
the state necessarily determines which competing use or uses of water best serve
and protect the public interest, and the appropriate balance between the uses, and
the legislature and not the courts is the appropriate institution for making these
policy judgments.224 Since the legislature is directly elected by and accountable to
the public, its judgment, almost by definition, reflects the public interest. In Illinois

218. N. Lake Tahoe Fire Prot. Dist. v. Washoe County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 310 P.3d 583, 586
(Nev. 2013); Superior Court. v. County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Cal. 1996); Carmel Valley
Fire Prot. Dist. v. State, 20 P.3d 533, 539 (Cal. 2001); In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 208 (Cal. 2002);
Younger v. Superior Ct., 577 P.2d 1014, 1024 (Cal. 1978); Bixby v. Pierno, 481 P.2d 242, 250 (Cal. 1971);
Davis v. Mun. Court., 757 P.2d 11, 17 (Cal. 1988).
219. Younger, 577 P.2d at 1024; Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 208.
220. Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 208; Younger, 577 P.2d at 1022–24.
221. Mendocino, 913 P.2d at 1051.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 70–81.
223. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 427–28; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728.
224. See text accompanying notes 50–65, supra.
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Central, for example, it was the Illinois legislature—not the Illinois courts—that
made the policy judgment of rescinding the grant of a fee interest in lands
underlying Lake Michigan in order to utilize the lands for other public purposes, and
the Supreme Court upheld the Illinois legislature’s right to make this policy
judgment.225 Thus, the legislative branch is the institution responsible for allocating
water among competing uses and for determining the appropriate balance
between public trust uses and other uses, such as, for example, the balance
between environmental uses, on the one hand, and economic and consumptive
uses like agricultural and domestic uses, on the other.
There is, of course, no bright line that separates these core judicial and
legislative functions, and that distinguishes between the judicial function, which is
to ensure that the state regulates water in the public interest, and the legislative
function, which is to actually regulate water in the public interest. Each branch is
responsible for exercising its own core function and for avoiding intrusion into the
core function of the other branch. Mineral County was very heedful of separationof-powers principles in deferring to the legislative judgment that finality of water
rights is in the public interest; the Court directly stated that “we [cannot] substitute
our own policy judgments for the Legislature’s.” 226 National Audubon was also
heedful of separation-of-powers principles in concluding that the state, through the
Legislature or the State Water Board, may as a matter of “current and historical
necessity” authorize water uses that impair public trust uses. But the court
appeared less heedful of these principles in concluding, for example, that public
trust uses have a higher priority than domestic uses that the Legislature determined
have the highest priority.227
C. Nature and Location of Public Trust Uses
Mineral County and National Audubon also appear to diverge concerning
the nature and location of the water uses that are within the ambit of the public
trust doctrine. Mineral County viewed the doctrine as protecting all uses of water
that the legislature has deemed beneficial to the public—including both economic
and environmental uses—and National Audubon, while recognizing that the
doctrine may protect economic uses as well as environmental uses, focused so
extensively on environmental uses that the Court appeared to view the doctrine as
primarily protecting environmental uses rather than other public uses. Also,
Mineral County viewed the doctrine as protecting public trust uses whether within
the source stream or elsewhere, and National Audubon viewed the doctrine as
protecting only public trust uses within the source stream.

225. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452–55.
226. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 430.
227 See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 728, 732.

198

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 58

More specifically, Mineral County held that the public trust doctrine does
not authorize reallocation of the defendants’ appropriative water rights to provide
more water for downstream public trust uses in Walker Lake.228 The defendants’
appropriative rights in Mineral County included the right to divert water for various
consumptive uses, such as “irrigation, power, municipal supply, mining, [and]
storage.”229 The use of water for such purposes, the Court stated, enabled the
state’s residents to “grow or purchase food and receive drinking water, electricity,
and other resources,” and enabled “[f]armers and miners . . . to grow their
industries, which in turn boosts the state’s economy.”230 Mineral County also made
clear that the public trust doctrine protects not only these consumptive uses but
also environmental uses, such as recreation, wildlife protection, wetlands, and
fisheries.231 Thus, Mineral County held that the public trust doctrine protects both
consumptive economic water uses and non-consumptive environmental uses.232 In
terms of location of the uses, the defendants’ appropriative water rights upheld in
Mineral County in many cases authorized diversions of water from the Walker River
to other locations, such as for municipal use and power generation, and thus the
uses were out-of-stream rather than solely instream.233 Thus, Mineral County held
that the public trust doctrine broadly protects all water uses that are in the public
interest as defined by the legislature, including both economic and environmental
uses, and regardless of whether the uses are within the source stream or
elsewhere.234
In contrast, National Audubon, although acknowledging in passing that the
public trust doctrine protects both commerce and environmental uses of water, 235
focused so exclusively on environmental uses in source streams that the court
appeared to view the doctrine as primarily protecting instream environmental uses
rather than other uses of water. National Audubon stated that public trust uses do
not include “all public uses” of water but only “uses and activities in the vicinity of”
source streams,236 thus making clear that doctrine protects only instream uses and
228. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 430.
229. Id. at 428.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 426–27.
232. Id. at 426–28.
233. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 422, 428.
234. Id. at 428.
235. National Audubon stated early in its decision that “the triad of [public trust] uses—
navigation, commerce and fishing—did not limit the public interest in the trust res,” Nat’l Audubon Soc’y,
658 P.2d at 719, and later acknowledged in a footnote that public trust uses include commerce as well
as environmental uses, and that the Legislature has the right to prefer one such trust use over another.
Id. at 722 n.21. But these passages were not the main focus of the decision. National Audubon appeared
to differentiate between instream environmental uses and commerce uses, stating that the state cannot
grant tidelands free of the public trust simply because the grant may serve “some public purposes” such
as a “commercial” purpose. Id. at 724.
236. Id. at 724.
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not out-of-stream uses. In describing the instream uses protected by the doctrine,
National Audubon mentioned only environmental uses, such as recreation,
aesthetics, fishing, hunting, bathing, swimming, and preservation of tidelands in
their “natural state.”237 The state has an “affirmative duty,” the Court stated, to
“protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and
tidelands.”238 In the case at hand, National Audubon applied the public trust
doctrine to protect specific instream environmental uses, such as aesthetics,
recreation and air quality, in Mono Lake, which the Court described as “a scenic and
ecological treasure of national significance.” 239 National Audubon favorably cited
law review articles that argued that the public trust doctrine should be interpreted
to protect instream environmental values and uses.240 Other court decisions have
also cited National Audubon as protective of instream environmental uses.241 As
one court stated, “although the [public trust] doctrine originally protected
navigable waterways for the purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishing,
Audubon Society . . . expanded the purpose of the doctrine to the preservation of
water’s function as natural habitat.”242
Thus, while Mineral County viewed the public trust doctrine as protecting
public uses of water regardless of the nature of the public use and regardless of
whether the use is instream or out-of-stream, National Audubon viewed the
doctrine as primarily protecting environmental uses within the source stream. To
be sure, National Audubon acknowledged that as a matter of “current and historical
necessity” the state may approve water diversions for out-of-stream uses even
though this may “unavoidably impair” trust uses in the source stream.243 But
National Audubon did not regard these out-of-stream uses as public trust uses,
because in its view public trust uses consist only of “uses and activities in the vicinity
of” the source stream.244 Thus, National Audubon viewed the state’s authority to
allocate water for out-of-stream uses as an exception to the public trust doctrine,
which was justified by “current and historical necessity,” while Mineral County
237. Id. at 719.
238. Id. at 724.
239. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 712.
240. The law review articles favorably cited by National Audubon bore such titles as “Some
Reflections on Environmental Considerations in Water Rights Administration,” “The Public Trust: A
Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People’s Environmental Right,” and “Public Trust
Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels.” Id. at 709 n.15, 720–21, 728.
241. See, e.g., Light v. State Water Resources Control Board, 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 212 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2014); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 596–97 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008).
242. Light, 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 211; see also FPL Group, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 596–97 (“[A]n important
purpose of the public trust over bodies of water is to protect the habitat for wildlife . . . .”).
243. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727.
244. Id. at 723.
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viewed the state’s authority to allocate water for such out-of-stream uses as a
feature of the public trust doctrine itself.
This does not suggest, of course, that National Audubon held or implied
that the public trust doctrine protects only instream environmental uses and not
other uses, but rather that National Audubon’s virtually exclusive focus on instream
environmental uses indicates that National Audubon viewed the doctrine as
primarily protecting such uses rather than other uses. The difference between
Mineral County and National Audubon in this respect is one of degree and not kind,
in that Mineral County viewed the doctrine as protecting all public uses of water
whether instream or out-of-stream, and National Audubon viewed the doctrine as
primarily protecting instream environmental uses rather than other uses. Thus,
Mineral County appeared to view the public trust doctrine as a doctrine of state
sovereignty, in that it protects the state’s sovereign right to regulate water in the
public interest regardless of the nature of the public interest, and National Audubon
appeared to view the doctrine primarily as an environmental law doctrine, in that
it primarily protects instream environmental uses. Since National Audubon was
decided in the wake of Congress’ passage of various environmental laws—such as
the National Environmental Policy Act (1969),245 the Clean Air Act (1970),246 the
Clean Water Act (1972),247 and the Endangered Species Act (1973),248 as well as
California’s passage of the Porter-Cologne Act (1969),249 which provides for
regulation of water quality--National Audubon might be viewed as establishing a
corollary common law principle of environmental law in the context of regulation
of water.
Mineral County’s view that the public trust doctrine protects myriad public
uses of water appears to more closely align than National Audubon with the
traditional view of the public trust doctrine, as the doctrine was developed in the
English common law and applied by the Supreme Court in its seminal decision in
Illinois Central. In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court held that the public trust
doctrine protects non-environmental public uses of water, such as “navigation” and
“commerce,” as well as environmental uses, such as “fisheries.”250 Indeed, Illinois
Central applied the doctrine to uphold Illinois’ right to revoke its grant of a fee
interest in lands underlying Lake Michigan to develop the lands for commercial
purposes, specifically to create a harbor for “shipping and commerce.”251 Earlier, in
Martin v. Waddell,252 which laid the foundation for the public trust doctrine, the
Supreme Court stated that the state holds navigable waters for the “common use”

245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47.
246. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–671.
247. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–388.
248. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44.
249. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000–16104.
250. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452.
251. Id. at 437–38.
252. 410 U.S. 367 (1842).
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of the public,253 and identified “common use” as including inter alia “navigation,
fishery, [and] the mooring of vessels.”254 Earlier still, under the English common law,
the English Crown’s sovereignty over navigable waters was subject to “common
rights” of the public, including the public’s right of navigation and free passage. 255
Thus, the public trust doctrine, as it has evolved from the English common law to
modern American law, has been recognized as protecting a broad array of public
uses of water and not just environmental uses. The doctrine traditionally has been
agnostic regarding the nature of protected public trust uses. In this respect, Mineral
County’s view of the doctrine more closely follows the traditional view of the
doctrine established in Illinois Central and its progenitor decisions than National
Audubon.
This does not, of course, suggest that either Mineral County or National
Audubon provided a more “correct” interpretation of the public trust doctrine, as if
there were such a more correct interpretation. As the United States Supreme Court
has held, each state is responsible for developing its own public trust doctrine and
determining its own public trust duties.256 The public trust doctrine is a flexible
doctrine that allows each state to determine its own public interest in regulation of
water, as informed by its own public needs, putting aside the institutional issue of
whether this policy judgment should be made by the legislative or judicial branches.
It is nonetheless instructive that while National Audubon interpreted the public
trust doctrine broadly as applied to environmental uses, Mineral County
interpreted the doctrine more broadly than National Audubon as applied to the
conglomeration of public uses protected under the doctrine.
D. Potential Limitation of Public Trust Doctrine: Taking of Property
The question of whether the public trust doctrine authorizes reallocation
of water rights, as raised in Mineral County and National Audubon, raises the
constitutional issue of whether such reallocation would result in a taking of
property under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, thus entitling
the holders of the rights to compensation. The Takings Clause, found in the
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment and made applicable to the states in the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that property may not be taken for public use
without payment of compensation.257

253. Id. at 410–11.
254. Id. at 383, 385.
255. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2012).
256. See supra notes 86–87, and accompanying text.
257. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”); Webb’s Fabulous Pharm. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980) (explaining Takings
Clause applies to states under Fourteenth Amendment).
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Although the takings issue was not raised in National Audubon, National
Audubon nonetheless addressed the takings issue, stating that the public trust
doctrine, as applied to water rights, does not result in a taking of property because
the water users have not been divested of “title” to their property; instead, they
hold the property subject to the public trust.258 The court stated that no one has a
“vested right” to use water in a manner harmful to public trust uses, 259 thus
indicating that a takings claim does not arise when the water is reallocated to
protect a public trust use.260 After the Court’s decision, LADWP raised the taking
issue in a certiorari petition to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the
court’s decision resulted in a taking of LADWP’s water rights, but the Supreme Court
denied the petition,261 likely because it was premature; National Audubon held only
that the State Water Board could reconsider LADWP’s water right permit, but no
action had been taken that deprived LADWP of any right to water.262
In Mineral County, the Ninth Circuit certified to the Nevada Supreme Court
the issue of whether reallocation of adjudicated water rights would result in a
taking of property under the Takings Clause of the Nevada Constitution, which is
modeled after the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.263 The Nevada Court did
not reach the takings issue because it concluded that the public trust doctrine does
not authorize reallocation of adjudicated water rights. 264 In earlier decisions,
however, the Nevada Supreme Court indicated that reallocation of water rights can
result in a taking of property under the Constitution because, the Court stated,
water rights are “vested” for purposes of “constitutional guaranties” if they have
“become fixed either by actual diversion and application to beneficial use or by
appropriation.”265 Thus, while National Audubon stated that there are no “vested
rights” to water that give rise to taking claims in public trust cases, the Nevada
Supreme Court indicated in earlier decisions that there are “vested rights” to water
that, if reallocated, may give rise to taking claims.
Although taking claims typically arise when the government, either federal
or state, exercises its power of eminent domain to physically seize property for a
258. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 721–23, 735 n. 22.
259. Id. at 445.
260. Earlier, the California Supreme Court had rejected a taking claim raised by grantees of
tidelands who claimed that the state had taken their rights in the tidelands, because, the Court stated,
the grantees did not lose title to the tidelands but instead retained it subject to the public trust. People
ex inf. Webb v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 88–89 (Cal. 1913). Subsequently to National Audubon, however,
a California appellate court stated in another case, in which public trust issues were raised, that water
rights are “vested property rights” and cannot be “taken” without “due process and just compensation.”
United States v. State Water Res. Cont. Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
261. City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 104 S.Ct. 413 (1983).
262. Id.
263. NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8; McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1126–27 (Nev. 2006).
264. Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 418, 430.
265. Nevada v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263, 266 (Nev. 1998) (quoting Application of Filippini, 202 P.2d
539, 537 (Nev. 1949)).
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public purpose,266 the United States Supreme Court has adopted the regulatory
takings doctrine, which holds that governmental regulation of property can also
result in a taking of property if the regulation goes “too far.”267 In Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York, the Supreme Court adopted a balancing test in
determining whether a regulation goes “too far.”268 The balancing test considers
the “economic impact” of the regulation on the property owner, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with the property owner’s “distinct investmentbacked expectation,” and the “character of the government action.”269 A regulation
that results in a “physical invasion” of the property, however, is a per se taking and
is not subject to the Penn Central balancing test.270 On the other hand, no taking
occurs if the regulation is supported by “background principles” of state nuisance
or property law.271
The Supreme Court and other courts have held that a water right is a form
of “property” within the meaning of the Takings Clause, which suggests that a state
regulation of a water right can result in a taking of property if the other elements
of a takings claim are present.272 Although a water right is a usufructuary right—in
that the holder of the right has the right to use water but does not own it273—the
right to use water is, itself, considered a form of property.274 The Supreme Court, at
least in the modern era, has never decided whether state regulation of an
appropriative water right, whether under the public trust doctrine or another
principle of law, may result in a taking of the property and entitle the holder of the
right to compensation.275 No takings issue arose in Illinois Central, which was
decided in 1892, long before the Supreme Court’s later adoption of the regulatory
takings doctrine.276
266. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–80 (2005).
267. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
268. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
269. Id. at 124.
270. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434–35 (1982).
271. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
272. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 124 (1983); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 179–180 (1979); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95–96 (1937); Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. at
737, 752–754; United States v. State Water Res. Cont. Bd., 277 Cal.Rptr. 161, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
Filippini, 202 P.2d at 537).
273. E.g., Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853).
274. E.g., Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. at 753; State Water Res. Cont. Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
275. Cf. Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 405–07 (1931). The Supreme Court held
that the federal government, in requisitioning a public power company’s production of electrical power
for national defense purposes, had taken the power company’s water rights and was required to pay
compensation to the power company under the Takings Clause. Id.
276. The Supreme Court adopted the regulatory takings doctrine in 1922, in Mahon, 260 U.S. at
415.

204

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 58

The question of whether reallocation of a water right under the public
trust doctrine may result in a taking of property within the meaning of the Takings
Clause raises broad issues of constitutional significance. One issue is whether a
taking of property can occur only as a result of regulatory actions taken by the
legislative or executive branches, or can also occur as a result of the judicial branch’s
interpretation of a property right that restricts or cancels the right. The issue,
framed differently, is whether the Takings Clause applies to all three branches of
government or only the legislative and executive branches. The Supreme Court
recently addressed this question in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of
Env’l Quality,277 but while a four-justice plurality decision argued that the Takings
Clause applies to all three branches of government and thus applies to judicial
interpretations of property, the Court failed to reach a majority decision.278
Another significant constitutional issue is whether the state’s authority to
reallocate a water right under the public trust doctrine is a “background principle”
of state nuisance or property law—in which case the reallocation would not be a
taking—or instead whether the state’s authority to reallocate the right is a
departure from such background principles, in which case the reallocation would
be a taking. Some argue that the public trust doctrine is a long-recognized and wellestablished—and therefore “background”—principle of state water law and thus
that reallocation of water rights under the doctrine does not result in a taking of
property.279 Others argue that the public trust doctrine has never been applied to
regulation of water, much less as a basis for restricting a water right, and thus that
reallocation of water rights under the doctrine can give rise to takings claims.280
Perhaps the takings issue may turn on whether, as Justice Potter Stewart opined in
a concurring decision, the courts interpret property in way that “constitutes a
sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents.” 281
Regardless of the answer to this constitutional question, National
Audubon’s view that the constitutional taking issue does not arise because the
water user has not lost “title” to its property is inconsistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s modern taking jurisprudence and is unlikely to be sustained.
277. Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’l Quality, 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
278. Id. at 713–14. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, a four-justice plurality opinion written by
Justice Scalia argued that the Takings Clause applies to all branches of government, and thus that a
court’s interpretation of property can result in a “judicial taking” of property. Id. at 719–29. A two-justice
concurring opinion written by Justice Kennedy argued that a judicial interpretation of property can result
in a violation of the Due Process Clause but not the Takings Clause, and thus a “judicial taking” cannot
occur. Id. at 742–45 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Kennedy concurring opinion argued, however, that
under the Due Process Clause the courts “may not have the power to eliminate established property
rights by judicial decision,” absent “direction from the executive or legislature.” Id. at 736. The other
justices argued that the Court should not address the taking issue. Id. at 742 (Breyer, J. concurring).
279. See, e.g., Appellants’ Opening Brief at 36-43, Mineral County v. Lyon County, 473 P.3d 418
(Nev. 2020) (No. 75917).
280. See, e.g., Respondents’ Answering Brief at 43-44, Mineral County, 473 P.3d 418 (No. 75917).
281. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Under the Supreme Court’s modern jurisprudence, as described above, the issue of
whether a taking occurs does not depend on whether the property owner has lost
“title” to the property, but instead depends on other factors—the balance of the
property owner’s and the states’ interests under Penn Central, whether the state
has effectively “physically seized” the property, and whether the state action is
supported by “background principles” of state law. The takings issue depends on
these factors and not on whether the water user has lost “title.” This significant
constitutional issue—whether a state reallocation of water rights under the public
trust doctrine results in a taking of the rights under the factors established by the
Supreme Court—has not been decided and awaits resolution by the courts, perhaps
by the Supreme Court, in an appropriate future case.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nevada and California Supreme Courts’ respective decisions in Mineral
County and National Audubon interpret the public trust doctrine similarly in many
respects but diverge concerning fundamental elements—whether the doctrine
authorizes reallocation of water rights; whether the courts should defer to the
legislative judgment in regulation of water rights or instead establish common law
principles that apply to and bind the legislative judgment; and the nature and
location of public trust uses protected by the doctrine. The Nevada and California
Supreme Courts’ differing interpretations of the public trust doctrine will likely
provide guidance to the courts of other states, as they develop their own public
trust doctrines and establish their own public trust duties.

